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Courtney M. Dorroll

The Position of the Niqab (the Face Veil) in Australia under Australia and Islamic Laws
Asmi John Wood

REVIEWS

FORUM
The Association of Muslim Social Scientists of North America (AMSS) is a non-profit membership-based organization that encompasses the United States and Canada. It was established in 1972 for the sole purpose of providing a forum through which Islamic positions on various academic disciplines can be promoted, with an emphasis on the social sciences and humanities.

AMSS has based its activities on the belief that the development of Islamic thought is vital for the prosperity of the Muslim world and for the continuity of the Islamic intellectual heritage. AMSS strives to serve the interests of the larger Muslim community by bringing together Muslim and non-Muslim scholars in an academic setting to examine and define Islamic perspectives on issues of global concern that contribute to the prosperity of Muslims around the globe and the betterment of humanity.

To encourage emerging Muslim scholars, AMSS established the “Best Graduate Paper Award” competition in 2001 for papers presented at its Annual Conference. AMSS also sponsors regional conferences in the United States and Canada.

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- To provide a comprehensive Islamic outlook through elucidating the principles of Islam and relating them to relevant issues of contemporary thought.
- To regain the intellectual, cultural, and civilizational identity of the ummah through the Islamization of the humanities and the social sciences.
- To rectify the methodology of contemporary Islamic thought in order to enable it to resume its contribution to the progress of human civilization and give it meaning and direction in line with the values and objectives of Islam.

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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL SCIENCES

A double blind peer-reviewed and interdisciplinary journal

Special Issue

Muslims and Political Change

Guest Editors
Malik Mufti, PhD
Katherine Bullock, PhD
Note to Contributors

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (AJISS) is a double blind peer-reviewed and interdisciplinary journal that publishes a wide variety of scholarly research on all facets of Islam and the Muslim world: anthropology, economics, history, philosophy and metaphysics, politics, psychology, religious law, and traditional Islam. Submissions are subject to a blind peer review process.

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Calls for Papers
Editorial

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the Muslim world is undergoing a political upheaval of historic proportions. The Arab Spring is one of the most recent and dramatic manifestations, with millions of men and women across the Arab world taking to the streets – often in the face of brutal repression – to demand the reform or overthrow of their authoritarian governments. Their bravery has already led to the ouster of four dictators – in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen – and the process is still far from over. But this uprising is only part of a much broader phenomenon, as a review of just the past five years demonstrates. In late 2008, largely free and fair elections ended two years of military-backed emergency rule in Bangladesh, and put the country back on a democratic track. In 2009, similar elections in Indonesia consolidated the democratic regime that had been in place there for just over a decade. That same year in Iran, by contrast, national elections, which were widely viewed as having been rigged, led to the so-called “Green Revolution” – the biggest prodemocratic uprising against the authoritarian regime there since the revolution of 1979. In 2010, Iraq held its second, and far more representative, elections since the overthrow of the Ba’athist regime. In 2011, national elections in Turkey that returned the AK Party to power with its largest electoral victory yet, coupled with ongoing judicial investigations into subversive activities by hard-line authoritarian elements, marked a decisive turning point in Turkey’s democratic evolution. In 2012, the willingness of Senegal’s president to step down peacefully after losing an election there seemed to confirm the victory of democracy in that country as well.

As the suppression of Iran’s Green Revolution, the 2012 military coup that interrupted Mali’s democratic experiment, and the ongoing violence in several of the other transitioning polities, indicate the process is neither smooth nor unidirectional. Several aspects of the current upheaval, however, are already clear. First and foremost, the political mobilization of the Muslim masses – the eruption of “people power” – is now an irreversible reality for the foreseeable future, so that only regimes that are genuinely representative and accountable can hope to enjoy any legitimacy in the future. Second, as public opinion poll after poll has demonstrated, democracy has become a hegemonic concept throughout the Muslim world as well – meaning that effective governance and opposition will need to take
place within its institutional and normative parameters. Third, as Table 1 shows, judging by the most recent election results, in most of the Middle Eastern states at least, political parties rooted in an Islamist background are likely to garner the lion’s share of electoral support for some time to come:

Table 1. Percentage of Islamist vote in Selected Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Combined Islamist Vote (percent)¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine (2006)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (2010)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (2011)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia (2011)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (2011–2012)</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These realities, in turn, give rise to a series of consequential questions:

- How exactly do the most prominent figures of the new political and intellectual dispensation – figures such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Rashid al-Ghannushi, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi – view the proper relationship between Islam and democracy?

- How deeply rooted is the normative evolution that has led mainstream Islamist parties – first in Turkey, and then in the Arab world – to accept the legitimacy of political diversity and pluralism, to affirm the people as the source of political authority, and to adopt democratic mechanisms such as parties and regular elections?
• To what extent can the “Turkish model,” for example – a model in which a certain balance between Islamist populists and secular-nationalists succeeded in suppressing the hard-liners on both sides and thereby in consolidating the democratic process – be replicated in the newly transitioning polities of the Arab world?

• And what role can professionalized state institutions such as the military and judiciary play in this process? What are the implications of the unfolding transition for the rights of women, ethnic minorities, and non-Muslims in the region?

• How will the mainstream Islamists deal with other elements such as Sufis, Salafis, or revolutionary militants of the al-Qaeda type?

On a parallel track, the emergence of sizeable and increasingly organized Muslim communities in non-Muslim majority countries raises another set of consequential questions. The challenges of balancing between majoritarian democracy and minority rights, and of upholding tolerance over bigotry, are now approached from the opposite perspective by Muslims – a somewhat frightening but also potentially enriching experience for the further development of Islamic political thought. Particularly in the United States and other Western powers, moreover, Muslim communities can add their voices to the foreign policy debates of those countries, thereby perhaps helping to create a more benign international environment for the momentous transformations underway in the Muslim world. Muslims living in established democracies will also be able to contribute their insights not just about the benefits but also the inevitable pitfalls – moral, cultural, political – of democratic life, the better to prepare their coreligionists in the transitioning polities for what lies ahead.

This Issue
The articles appearing in this special issue of the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences constitute one set of attempts to begin addressing some of these questions. Yanwer Pribadi’s article on the “Kiai in Madura: Their Roles in Local Politics in Indonesia” sets the stage by considering the interaction between a traditional institution of religious leadership on the one hand, and the rapidly evolving modern political world on the other. He
argues that traditional kiai leaders have adapted well to the modern world, are neither anti-modern nor antidemocratic, but rather crucial intermediaries between the modern state and villagers in Madura.

Fait Muedini’s “Sufism, Politics, and the Arab Spring” extends this line of analysis to the Arab Spring by showing how Sufis in Syria and Egypt – another traditional grouping often viewed as apolitical – are finding themselves, like everybody else in their communities, impelled to take a stand on the contested political issues of the day. Here again, simplistic dichotomies of “traditional” and “modern,” “apolitical” and “politically engaged,” are called into question by an analysis of how actors of different types are led by their concerns and aspirations into the turbulent political arenas of our time – and this process in turn helps to shape the contours of the new order that is emerging.

Ahmed Elewa adopts a more theoretical approach to this question in his article, “Articulating ‘Responsibility’ as a Prerequisite for the Arab Spring.” Here, he investigates the centrality of “responsibility” as a concept in contemporary Islamic discourse, and its role in catalyzing and activating citizens into political action. His article reveals that the use of the concept “responsibility,” although present in classical exegeses and fiqh nevertheless represents an Arabization and Islamization of a Western concept. He argues that responsibility became a key mobilizing theme in the lead up to the Arab Spring, and that it encapsulates a promise of meeting the real needs of citizens.

Elhum Haghighat then draws our attention to a crucial dimension of political and social development in her article “The Paradox Between Women’s Educational Attainment and Social Mobility in the Middle East and North Africa.” Pointing out that contrary to the expectations of Modernization Theory, for example, increased access to educational opportunities by women in the Middle East and North Africa has not correlated with a broader improvement in socioeconomic status and mobility. Unless the emerging political actors in the region – and the Islamists foremost among them – take into account and address this troubling phenomenon, she suggests, the full promise of the Arab Spring cannot be realized.

The final two articles of this special issue then turn to the challenges facing Muslim minorities abroad. In her article “On the Visual Apartheid in Western Europe: Architectural Hegemony in the German Urban Landscape,” Courtney Dorroll analyzes the inclusion and exclusion of Muslim immigrants in contemporary German public discourse through the lens of
architecture – in particular, the debates surrounding mosque construction in various German cities.

And in “The Position of the Niqab (Face Veil) in Australia under Australian and Islamic Laws,” Asmi Wood approaches the same general issue of cultural and religious coexistence, only this time via an investigation of the compatibility between the two legal traditions as they relate to Islamic garb. He seeks to provide the Australian judicial system a range of Islamically-grounded perspectives on hijab and niqab that judges and lawyers can refer to when dealing with Muslim litigants in the court system. His article will be of use and interest in other jurisdictions, as all Western legal systems currently face similar questions of how to deal with face- and head-coverings in the legal process.

All of these articles relate to the concept of “political change” understood in a broad way, to encompass regime or governmental change – issues that must be addressed by governments (as in legislative needs) and, finally, social issues that provide a sculpting landscape in which politics is carried out (that is, the societal terrain). It is our hope that opening an investigation into these issues will help enable Muslims to begin thinking through the challenges that face them in the most constructive ways, and to mold polities in the twenty-first century that allow their citizens to flourish.

In the forum section, we are happy to present a relevant piece, Daniel Hummel’s “Islam and the Constitutions in Newly Reformed Countries in the Middle East: Putting an End to Tyrannical Rule.” Writing a few months before the Egyptian elections, Hummel reflects on the role of Islam and the constitutions of Egypt and Libya; how Islamic elements must respect and be sensitive to non-Muslims when they try to balance between Islamic law and the constitution; and how the constitutions must be inclusive for the benefit of all citizens.

Finally, we are glad to announce that at the end of this issue, there is a “Call for Papers” for 2013 special issue on the topic of “Islamist Spring? Islamists and the State: New Paradigms and Engagements.” We invite all our readers who are experts on this subject to consider contributing their research.

Note
1. These are the percentages of the popular vote won by Hamas in Palestine; by Shi‘ah, Sunni, and Kurdish parties that self-identify in Islamic terms in Iraq; by the AK Party (49.8 percent), the Felicity Party, and People’s Voice Party in Turkey; by al-Nahda in Tunisia; and by the Democratic Alliance for Egypt (dominated by the Muslim
Brotherhood: 37.5 percent), the Islamist Bloc (dominated by the Nur Party), and the Al-Wasat Party in Egypt.

Guest Editors:

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Kiai in Madura: Their Roles in Local Politics in Indonesia

Yanwar Pribadi

Abstract

This article deals with the roles of kiai in Madura as both traditional and modern leaders. I will look at the principal ways in which kiai, who symbolize Islamic leadership, have characterized Islam and politics in Madura by arranging themselves in conflicts and accommodations within Madurese society. In doing so, I will portray two prominent Madurese kiai figures. I maintain that kiai in Madura are the main actors in state-society relations. They have become the social, cultural, economical, and political brokers in Madurese villages. Kiai with their pesantren and the Nahdatul Ulama’s network have cautiously responded to state power by establishing multifaceted relations with the state; these are relationships that range from distancing themselves from the government to forming mutually beneficial relations with the state when the power of the state is too strong to oppose or when making alliance with the government is seen as a useful choice.
Introduction

Madura is an island located off the northeastern coast of Java, separated from the island of Java by the Madura Strait. It is administratively part of the East Java Province. The island, from west to east, consists of four regencies – Bangkalan, Sampang, Pamekasan, and Sumenep – and comprises an area of approximately 4,250 square kilometers. According to the 2007 census, the island has a population of 3,751,977, most of whom are Muslims. Although Madura is not completely distinctive with regard to socioreligious characteristics compared to other parts of Indonesia, the Madurese Muslim culture on the island is best represented by three particular elements: Islamic education institutions, the pesantren (Islamic boarding school); Islamic groupings, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU); and Islamic leaders, the kiai. Like some religiously-associated regions in Indonesia, such as Aceh or Banten in Madura, where the society is traditionally connected to a religious point of view, many of the local traditions and customs have become linked with religion.

A strict distinction between the terms ulama and kiai is not applied in this paper. According to one Indonesian scholar, Deliar Noer, the term kiai may indicate two kinds of persons. The first is someone whose knowledge of Islam surpasses that of ordinary people, and who typically devote himself to teaching. The second is more closely related to a dukun (healer), who teaches mystical and secret doctrines and practices all kinds of medicine. Hiroko Horikoshi distinguishes the terms kiai and ulama. For Horikoshi, a Japanese anthropologist, the difference lies primarily in the more extensive charisma that a kiai possesses. The ulama play more roles in the social system and the social structure of villagers, and their ultimate status is legitimized by hereditary factors. Among the people in West Java where Horikoshi conducted his research, the kiai is higher in rank than the village ulama, and their presence is regarded as a unifying symbol in society. In Indonesian society at large, the word ulama may be used arbitrarily to refer to kiai. In Madura, the term kiai also has meaning in leadership and in other nonreligious realms. In a broader context, the term ulama refers to men of Islamic learning and to Islamic religious leaders in general. Hence, I use both terms, ulama and kiai interchangeably.

There are several kinds of kiai in Madura. Kiai pesantren are generally regarded as the highest in rank. There are also kiai tarekat who usually lead a pesantren too, but who are more recognized as tarekat (Islamic mystical brotherhood) teachers. The next category is kiai dukun, shamans or medicine men. The last and the lowest in the hierarchy of kiai in Madura are kiai langgar who run a langgar (small mosque) in villages. In this ar-
ticle, I focus mostly on the *kiai pesantren* since they are the real agents of sociopolitical-economical-cultural life in Madura, and represent the Madurese religious culture. *Kiai pesantren* fit Eric Wolfe’s concept of “cultural broker” who “connect the local system to the larger whole” and who select what is appropriate for the local society.9 *Kiai pesantren* and *kiai tarekat* correspond to cultural brokers due to their possessions of higher resources than any other component of the society. *Kiai* take advantage from their possessions that may be material capitals, such as land or money – or non-material capitals, such as the accumulation of knowledge.

I will discuss the roles of *kiai* in Madura as both traditional and modern leaders during the New Order period (1966–1998, under the Suharto presidency) and the *Era Reformasi* (the reformation era from 1998 up to the present time). I will look at the principal ways in which *kiai*, who symbolize Islamic leadership, have characterized Islam and politics in Madura by arranging themselves in conflicts and accommodations within Madurese society and have used their position to enhance their social standing and political well-being in state-society relations. In doing so, I will portray two prominent Madurese *kiai*.

Though in reality exceptions occur (as some *kiai* are considered modern), *kiai* are considered traditionalists who are incompatible with neomodernists ideas and puritanical conceptions of Islam. Clifford Geertz, an anthropologist who conducted research in Java during the Old Order era, underestimated *kiai* and their roles, especially in brokering local cultures and modernity, which he downplayed.10 I would argue, however, that *kiai* in Madura are the main actors in state-society relations. They have become the cultural, economical, and political brokers in Madurese villages. The state via village officials has attempted to reduce the political influence of *kiai*, especially during general elections. Meanwhile, *kiai* with their *pesantren* and the NU’s network have cautiously responded to state power by establishing multifaceted relations with the state that range from distancing themselves from the government to forming mutually beneficial relations with the state when the power of the state is too strong to oppose or when making an alliance with the government is seen as a useful choice. As Elly Touwen-Bouwsma reveals, at the village level, the support of the *kiai* is needed to involve villagers in the implementation of government programs.11 Among the questions I am asking in this article are:

1. What was the background of the emergence of *kiai* as religious leaders in Madura?

2. How do they preserve their position in society?
3. What factors guide the interaction between kiai and the political world?
4. To what extent have traditional kiai adapted to the modern political world?

**Men of Religion: The Emergence of K**ai**i as Religious Leaders**

For contemporary Madurese, religious leaders means kiai. However, the meaning of the term kiai in Madurese tradition has not been static throughout time. Originally, kiai was a title by which people who had a special characteristic, either in a positive or negative sense, were addressed. Therefore, a criminal or even a Chinese Muslim merchant could be called a kiai if they demonstrated a special characteristic – for example, in martial arts or in trading activities in comparison to commoners. Kiai was also one of the Madurese noble titles.

Kiai tarekat, kiai pesantren and other religious figures, particularly those involved in arranging the religious life in villages, were able to improve their position among village inhabitants in the nineteenth century due to their central roles in religious life. They were needed especially during ritualistic festivities, events that have been well-preserved to the present day. Moreover, some kiai, besides showing their capacity as men of learning in the religious realm, also performed mystical Islam – such as predicting the future, healing people’s illnesses and giving martial arts lessons. The supernatural powers drawn from mystical Islam were indeed important attributes in the development of power and authority.

In the meantime, the local aristocracies were slowly incorporated into the Dutch colonial administration during the nineteenth century. To religious figures and villagers, this meant that the elites had allied themselves with the infidel power of the Dutch. As a result, religious leaders and villagers faced disappointment and dissatisfaction since they had viewed the elites as autonomous, ideal, and influential leaders. The people then searched for others to give guidance. It is clear that people could not accept their leaders being integrated into the colonial administration. Unlike the local political elites, the religious figures such as kiai succeeded in preserving their independence, and villagers gradually turned to them. This is not to say that the religious leaders only came to occupy an important position among the villagers only after the Dutch East Indies were placed under the authority of Governor-General Herman Willem Daendels in 1808. They had been central local leaders in religious, spiritual, and limited social matters before. The decline of the local aristocracies’ legal leadership simply
led the *kiai* to reinforce their position in society. The changing pattern of the local hierarchy due to the Dutch colonial government in Madura can thus be seen as the main factor in strengthening the position of the *kiai* as religious leaders.

In present-day Madurese religious spheres, in order to be acknowledged in the religious circle, a common pattern is that a *kiai* must meet three essential requirements: he has to belong to a *kiai* family; he has to lead a *pesantren*; and he has to belong to the NU. If one cannot meet one of the three requirements, he cannot be considered *kiai* in the vast network of *kiai* in Madura.\(^{14}\) Exceptions, however, do occur. *Kiai* Fuad Amin Imron, the current regent of Bangkalan (for the periods 2003–2008 and 2008–2013) is regarded as a *kiai* even though he has never led a *pesantren*. The fact that he is held in such high regard seems rather to be because he is a great-grandson of *Kiai* Kholil\(^ {15}\) and a son of *Kiai* Amin Imron, a leading *kiai* of the NU and the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – the United Development Party).

The high status of the *kiai* is also enjoyed by their families. People’s regard for the *kiai* families is central to the *kiai* and his families’ success in winning sympathy as shown in their deeds. Their institutions and personalities have also played significant roles in gaining such success to obtain followers. Although exceptions occur, the position of *kiai* in Madura is an assigned status, in which *kiai*’s children (especially but not exclusively the sons) also enjoy the high status given to their father – a position that they will also assume, whether involuntarily or not, later in life.

Moreover, the prestige of a *kiai* is collected from the gathering of visitors. Top *kiai* are aware that they can get a more accurate image of society by meeting people not only from their own region, but also from other areas. During the New Order era, when access to radio, television, newspapers, and magazines belonged only to the minority of the educated people in villages, *kiai* were able to spread up-to-date topics to their visitors. Via the latest information they possessed, they could create more concern among the visitors about the sociopolitical world outside their place of origin. However, they were also aware that by presenting their independence, *kiai* could prove that they were responsible only to God. By distancing themselves from the irreligious realm, *kiai* fruitfully gained the trust from their followers. As long as a *kiai* was independent, he would enjoy leadership among his followers. By exercising these attitudes, *kiai* demonstrated their roles as religious leaders.
Kiai as the Leaders of People’s Power

During the New Order period, development projects became essential issues in many regions in Indonesia. The central government targeted Madura as one of the many areas to be industrialized. The processes, however, were not smooth. There were several rejections of plans to build mega projects on the island. Two major situations arose as the result of the rejections. The first is the people and Kiai’s rejection of the Nipah (or Nepa) Dam (details below) and the other is the Kiai’s refusal of the government’s plan to establish industrial areas. The plan was included in a mega project that would also simultaneously build the Suramadu Bridge, which would connect the islands of Java and Madura and would be the country’s longest bridge. The Nipah Dam incident was marked by four deaths, while the Suramadu Bridge affair was completed without physical violence. The creation of the Nipah Dam and the Suramadu Bridge was characterized by the involvement of Kiai as the leaders of people’s power. In this section, I describe the participations of Kiai in politics. The emphasis is put on the roles of Kiai Alawy Muhammad, a prominent Kiai in Sampang, recognizable by his distinctive turban and robe-styles clothing. The first important role is seen in his protest against the violence in the Nipah Dam incident. His second central role is important in the election campaigns at the national and regional levels.

Kiai Alawy is a striking figure for many Madurese. He is the fourth son of eleven siblings and was born when the Dutch powers still occupied his fatherland. His father was a small, low-level Kiai who possessed extensive knowledge of Islam. When Kiai Alawy was a teenager, due to hard times on Madura, he escaped from the island and lived in Malang, East Java. In Java, he gained a more respectable status than before (when he was a petty trader in Madura) by becoming a merchant. During the Sukarno regime, he went to Mecca not only for pilgrimage, but also to study there. Like many Madurese Kiai who had studied earlier, as soon as he returned to his homeland, he led a pesantren and began to spread his influence.

Kiai Alawy first became known at a national level in September 1993, when the Nipah Dam incident happened in the Banyuates district of Sampang, approximately sixty kilometres north of the capital of the regency. The Nipah Dam incident was a bloody confrontation between residents of Banyuates district and police officers and soldiers that resulted in the death of four people. The central government of Indonesia, via the local government of Sampang, planned to build a dam in the district. Landowners within the site protested the plan to acquire their property, including a number of mosques and sacred cemeteries. According to one of the vice chair-
men of the regency’s parliament (*Kiai* Moh. Ismail Muzakki), the regent of Sampang, Bagus Hinayana, in a meeting on September 20, 1993 with residents of Banyuates in Planggaran Timur village, intimidated villagers who refused the plan to build a dam in their area by threatening to shoot those who rejected the plan. On September 25, 1993, around five hundred villagers, many of whom it is said were carrying sharp weapons, confronted officials of Badan Pertanahan Nasional (the National Land Commission) and Kantor Sosial Politik (the Social Politics Office), and several police officers and soldiers from the Planggaran Timur village. The military then opened fire. After the incident, *Kiai* Alawy, together with Sampang residents, demanded justice. Vice President Try Sutrisno asked *Kiai* Alawy to calm down the fiery situation in Sampang. As a result of the protest, the soldiers who had shot four people were brought to court and penalised. Furthermore, the chief commander of the local armed forces in Sampang, Lieutenant Colonel (Artillery) Sugeng Wiyono and the chief commander of the local police (Polres Sampang), Lieutenant Colonel (Police) Siswinaro, were dismissed. However, the regent, who had allowed the armed forces to shoot, remained in charge until the end of his tenure in 1995.

*Kiai* Alawy’s involvement in the violent Nipah Dam incident can be interpreted as due to a demand by the public: the people have great expectations of their leaders. Moreover, because *Kiai* Alawy was as a prominent *kiai* in Sampang, the government asked him to help resolve the incident. The government realized that it was easier to ask *kiai* to pacify the heated situation than to cope with the tense circumstance without involving local leaders. The situation indicates three important aspects. First, the position of *kiai* in society is so high that the people request them to be people’s representatives to voice their concerns. Second, the government saw the *kiai* as mediators in disputes with the people, and this clearly indicated the importance of *kiai* as brokers. Third, following the incident, the position of *kiai* Alawy and other *kiai* who were involved in the mediation process became stronger in society and in the eyes of the government. It is obviously very good for their reputation in the future, especially in the political realms.

In political spheres, utilizing his rhetorical abilities, *Kiai* Alawy attempted to convince his followers that participation in politics is compulsory for Muslims. As a Madurese *kiai*, his support for the NU is almost unquestionable. The NU from its establishment until the present day has provided numerous Madurese *kiai* with a great political network. The traditional network based on kinship and marriage certainly is still important, although it was through the NU network that *Kiai* Alawy was able to reach...
higher levels in the political world. When the NU at its 1984 congress decided to return to its 1926 charter (or the 1926 khittah),23 Kiai Alawy criticized it. He also repeatedly stated his opposition against the attempt to secularize the organisation by accepting Pancasila (the official five-pillars philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state) as its sole ideology. The board of the NU Pasuruan reported that when he delivered a sermon in Pasuruan on March 1, 1997, he had even slammed the NU for its decision to return to the 1926 khittah.24

The withdrawal of the NU from the PPP caused bewilderment in Madura. After the 1971 general elections, all Muslim parties were amalgamated into the PPP, and all nationalist and Christian parties were fused into the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – the Indonesian Democratic Party) in 1973. While in other places, the removal was somewhat less problematic to accept, in Madura, the NU followers, who were mostly villagers were undecided about whether to vote for the PPP or for other parties in the next elections in 1987. They were waiting for the instruction from their kiai whether they would vote for the PPP again or whether the kiai would ask them to give support to other parties. A number of kiai in Madura believed that voting for Golkar (the ruling party) would mean a betrayal to Islam, while giving preference to the PDI was unlikely to reap rewards. As a result, according to many kiai, the PPP remained the only feasible party to pick – although prior to its Twenty-seventh Congress, the chairman of the NU, Kiai Idham Chalid, encouraged nahdliyin (the NU followers) to have free political aspirations – not only to the PPP, but also possibly to Golkar or the PDI.25 To avoid perplexity among the NU followers, the kiai decided to be more pragmatic by persuading nahdliyin to vote for a party that defends and promotes Islamic values, and this was considered by nahdliyin as a plea to vote for the PPP. Like many kiai, Kiai Alawy also believed that the PPP was a party for Muslims. He insisted that it was a big sin for Muslims to vote other than the PPP in the 1987 elections. However, the results of the 1987 elections in Madura were fruitless for the PPP. For the first time during the New Order era, Golkar gained victory in the island.

During the 2008 Pilkada (Pemilihan kepala daerah – elections in a province or regency to elect a governor or a regent) of East Java province, Kiai Alawy was a commanding figure in his support for one of the pairs of candidates. Khofifah Indar Parawansa, the only female candidate for governor, paired with Mudjiono (a general officer at the Kodam V/Brawijaya, a military area command of the Indonesian Army, which oversaw the East Java province) under the slogan KAJI (KhofifAh and MudJIono) to run in the elections. This partnership was legitimated by a fatwā from the kiai in
2008. The fatwā was issued in response to his followers and a number of kiai who questioned the legality of voting for a female candidate. In the fatwā, the kiai declared that a woman has the right to struggle like a man. He also denied the view that forbids a woman to be a leader. Consequently, he appealed to the people of Sampang and Bangkalan to vote for the couple. Moreover, he gathered several kiai, klebun (village head), public figures, and thousands of people from Sampang and Bangkalan together at a wedding feast for his grandchild to rally support from his devotees. Although a few of the five pairs of candidates had an Islamic background, the concentration of voting centered primarily on two pairs. Competing against Khofifah and Mudjiono, the other strong pair was Soekarwo and Syaifullah Yusuf, under the slogan KARSA (SoeKarwo and SyaiFullAh Yusuf).26 Gus Ipul (the nickname of Syaifullah Yusuf) was well-known, and possessed the traditional genealogy of NU leaders (a nephew of Abdurrahman Wahid). However, Khofifah was also a prominent figure in the NU and had been a minister during the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency. In Bangkalan, Kiai Imam Buchori Kholil, who is a descendant of the legendary Kiai Kholil, also gave support to Khofifah. It was also in Bangkalan where a dispute between descendants of Kiai Kholil occurred. Another prominent figure of Kiai Kholil’s clan, the current regent Kiai Fuad Amin Imron stood behind KARSA. The two kiai made use of the popularity of their common ancestor to rally support for the competing candidates.

One of the most visible features in the long process of the Pilkada was the involvement of the NU’s top figures. Their support was a significant contribution to candidates such as Khofifah, Ali, Gus Ipul, and Achmadi. However, such support led to dissension among NU followers. It is interesting to note that although the NU’s top figures insisted that the support from several of NU’s kiai was not an official policy of the organization, a considerable number of influential kiai were actively recruited to campaign for the contenders. The fact that the NU was the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, especially in East Java, was taken into consideration by political parties, and the main political party candidates were NU followers. For example, the PPP candidate was Khofifah, Golkar’s was Ali, while Partai Demokrat (PD – The Democrat Party) and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN – The National Mandate Party) gave their support to Gus Ipul and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB – The National Awakening Party) sponsored Achmadi.27 Since the NU has attracted major kiai in East Java who were centers of local networks, it was able to rally the voters through such networks. Some prominent kiai knew their vast networks very well. For instance, kiai who belonged to the PPP knew that the people of the Eastern
Salient area of East Java had been instrumental in the victory of the PPP during the New Order era, at least until the general elections of 1987. As a result, KAJI won in the Tapal Kuda (the Pasuruan, Probolinggo, Jember, Lumajang, and Banyuwangi area),28 where in some municipalities the Madurese are the majority of the inhabitants. Meanwhile, some progressive kiai in Mojokerto, Jombang, Nganjuk, and Kediri – under the umbrella of the PD and the PAN – also maximized their influence by gaining support from the majority of the voters. Consequently, KARSA won in this area.

Kiai Alawy, like many other kiai who supported their own candidate during the Pilkada, was aware that his open yet observant attitude could significantly boost the fame of his candidate among visitors who happened to visit him. Since visitors come to see kiai whenever a problem arises and certainly when they have funds to pay for the visit – during the Pilkada process, kiai applied different policy. The daily timetable for a kiai for teaching santri (pupils of a pesantren) and leading prayers did not become the defining and practical factor in receiving visitors. Instead, they served as the spokespersons of the candidates and sometimes acted beyond their capacity as men of religion. For some kiai, such as Kiai Alawy, supporting certain candidates or certain political parties in elections, as long as it was not for Golkar during the New Order, was a vital way to preserve their position in society. This demonstrated the importance of kiai as central actors in local politics in Indonesia.

The Kiai as the Ultimate Moderate Leader

In this section, I illustrate the beneficial factors that attract kiai to become involved in politics and the ability of kiai to adapt to the modern political world.

Nonpartisan Kiai in the New Order

Kiai Nuruddin Rahman is a notable figure – not only in Bangkalan, his place of origin – but also in East Java Province. Although he never formally associates himself with any political party, his influence goes beyond his pesantren, and he is an eminent religious leader in the world of Madurese kiai. His influence in Bassra (Badan Silaturahmi Kiai Pesantren Madura – The Association of Friendship of Madurese Pesantren Kiai),29 first as the leading spokesperson and then as member of the Central Coordinator Council, has been demonstrated not only in the religious realm, but also in sociopolitical spheres. Moreover, his leadership in two pesantren in Bangkalan has attracted certain political parties to try to recruit him as a leading cadre of these political parties. So, these political parties attempted to ap-
point him as a cadre of these political parties. However, they failed as Kiai Nuruddin did not want to join any political party. I hope my explanation is clear. Kiai Nuruddin was born in 1957. Like many other santri, he studied in several pesantren, such as Pesantren Al Khozini in Sidoarjo, East Java and Pesantren Darul Ulum, in Jombang. As a child, he spent some years in a number of pesantren in Madura, such as Pesantren Darul Hikmah and Pesantren Al-Hamdaniyah. He later attended two universities – a private university in Surabaya where he obtained a bachelor degree in law, and in a then state-funded university in Bangkalan where he obtained another degree in law. Kiai Nuruddin comes from a lower kiai family. His study times in Java were the early stages in the formation of his thought on social and religious issues.

Kiai Nuruddin’s early participation in the sociopolitical realm can be traced to several organizations of which he was a member: Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI – The National Committee of Indonesian Youth), Ikatan Pelajar Nahdatul Ulama (IPNU – The Student Association of Nahdatul Ulama), Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (GP Ansor – The Youth Movement of Ansor), and Majelis Wilayah Cabang Nahdatul Ulama (MWCNU – The Branch District Assembly of Nahdatul Ulama). The second and the third organizations are the NU’s wing organizations. Kiai Nuruddin’s contributions in the NU has led him to take a number of strategic positions within the organization. For instance, he was one of the board members of the NU branch in Bangkalan, and at present, he is one of the vice chairmen of the syuriah (the Supreme Religious Council) of the NU branch of East Java Province. During the period from 2004 to 2009, he was a member of Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD – The Regional Representative Council) representing East Java Province.

One of his earliest involvements in the sociopolitical sphere was due to the plan to build a bridge connecting Java and Madura. In Madura, Kiai Nuruddin represented Bassra. Bassra was said to have been established because of the concerns of Madurese kiai to strengthen the ties between kiai who lead pesantren in Madura. As part of its development, the nonformal organization has also become a medium by which the Madurese kiai are able to voice their sociopolitical concerns. One of their early concerns was their rejection of Porkas/SDSB (the state-sponsored lottery). The organization is also concerned with aliran sesat (religious deviation) as well as other kemaksiatan (in violation of God’s law). The strong opposition of Bassra to the plan to establish industrial areas highlighted it as a rival to the government during the Suharto regime, and the action had a large public impact.
Despite Kiai Nuruddin’s lack of allegiance to any particular political party, in two interviews with me, he stated that he was a sympathizer of the PPP during the New Order era.\textsuperscript{30} During the Suharto administration, many kiai were concerned that they could have been alienated and isolated from their networks if they had or were considered to have certain ties with the government. The reluctance of most kiai to join various state-sponsored associations generated problems for those organizations in attracting prominent kiai. On a bigger scale, the unwillingness of well-known kiai to join Golkar was caused by the concern with the possibility of being neglected by and secluded not only from their extensive religious networks but also from society. Even though it was not unusual in many part of Indonesia for prominent kiai and other religious figures to maintain a close relationship with Golkar and even campaign during the general elections\textsuperscript{31} – in Madura, it would be incorrect to state that most kiai served as partners of the government. Most kiai remained outside the structure of central power. They were very much aware that such an alliance with the government could be a disadvantage to their influence over the people. Such a situation could include the departure of santri from their pesantren, and more importantly, a loss of religious authority.

Kiai Nuruddin’s nonaligned position during the New Order era was derived from this point of view. He claimed that being a kiai means belonging to the public. As a public religious figure, he distanced himself from affirming his support for the regime during the New Order era, but he was aware that secular groups and government-backed public religious figures might criticize him for basing his neutrality on political expediency. Certainly, he consciously recognized the benefits and the disadvantages of his position. He was frequently asked to link with the PPP, as well as to join the ruling party, and he enjoyed the freedom to be acknowledged by the population as well as other kiai and the government that invited him for religious festivities. His relationships with diverse groups in fact, strengthened his influence over society and increased his religious power. Moreover, he did not enjoy the privilege of “state-sponsored” kiai, who were seen to have good positions in state-initiated Islamic organizations, such as Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah, which were composed of civil servants, teachers, and a small number of religious leaders. However, he claimed that he did not regret it due to the fact that these state-sponsored Islamic organizations were viewed in a somewhat negative light, because they voiced the government’s ideas.
Kiai and Politics in the Post-Suharto Era

After the Suharto regime collapsed, the relationships between the central government and the religious leaders changed. Alongside the rise of more independent religious leaders, the sole authority of the state, as well as its coercive force, began to disappear. The Suharto administration had placed itself as a regime attempting to reform the previous rule (the Old Order) and to guide the state toward a rightful and democratic course, while the post-Suharto era has set out more democratic and decentralized policies, allowing people’s leaders in many regions to spread their influence.

Kiai Nuruddin, who was never officially endorsed by the government, began to promote his independent position from political parties in the New Order as a valuable tool in order to maintain and even to acquire a strategic position in the newly democratic and decentralized circumstances as well as to gain access to economic resources. During the Konferensi Wilayah NU Jawa Timur (the Regional Conference of the NU East Java) on October 11–13, 2002, Kiai Nuruddin was a strong candidate for the chairman position of the NU of East Java. He was backed by the supporters from the Tapal Kuda area, perhaps unsurprising, considering the region is known as a migration area for the Madurese. However, the support was not sufficient, and the supporters began to question Imam Nahrowi’s endorsement of Kiai Nuruddin. Imam was at that time the head of Garda Bangsa of East Java, a paramilitary group affiliated with the PKB. He was known as Matori Abdul Djalil’s supporter in the internal conflict of the PKB between Matorî’s PKB in Batutulis and Alwi Shihab’s PKB in Kuningan (with Abdurrahman Wahid as its central figure). Most nahlîyin were against Matori in the dispute, and apparently this hatred also appeared during the conference. They did not want to vote for Kiai Nuruddin since Imam’s affiliation with the kiai might lead to a failure like the conflict. Ali Maschan Moesa (the same person mentioned in the note 26) became the winner; he defeated Kiai Nuruddin by a wide margin. Sunan Ampel Surabaya gained victory by a wide margin in the election. Apparently, the more pragmatic attitude of Kiai Nuruddin after the fall of Suharto, as he appeared to become more involved in politics, sabotaged his efforts to gain leadership, at least within the local NU. The kiai’s failure to fulfil his followers’ expectation not to be too involved with the conflict resulted in his unpopularity in the election process. Following the loss, Kiai Nuruddin became more involved in politics. His involvement in politics marks his new political orientations. Nevertheless, he was still aware that he could support any political party or give preference to certain political figures as long as he carried it out under the banner of Islam and as long as he remained outside the state power.
In the first direct presidential election in 2004, the incumbent president Megawati paired with Hasyim Muzadi, the general chairman of the NU. During the election, Megawati became the target of several fatwā forbidding votes for a female presidential candidate. The radical Islamic group Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI – The Indonesian Mujahedin Council) issued a fatwā against a female president. The organization had been already clear on the subject three years before, when Megawati replaced Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001. Meanwhile, on June 3, 2004 a group of fifteen old kiai, known as “Kiai Sepuh,” gathered in Pesantren Raudlatul Ulum, Pasuruan to issue a fatwā not to vote for a female president. Among the kiai were Kiai Abdullah Faqih of Pesantren Langitan, Tuban; Kiai Chotib Umar of Pesantren Raudlatul Ulum Jember; and Kiai Mas Subadar as the host. They argued that women could become leaders of a country only when there were no eligible male candidates, and stated that it could be made possible only in an emergency situation. For Megawati-Hasyim, the fatwā which was disseminated in a sensational way by the mass media was a heavy blow. Many parts of society argued that some elements of Islamic organizations had begun politicizing religious domains. The fatwā from kiai of the NU was an outcome from a contest of legitimacy, not only in terms of scriptural understanding of the Qurʾān and Hadith, but also in a sociopolitical framework between the supporters of Megawati-Hasyim and Wiranto-Salahuddin Wahid, a younger brother of Abdurrahman Wahid and a top NU figure. Therefore, such fatwā were not really surprising, given the large number of nahdliyin who could potentially be convinced not to vote for Megawati-Hasyim.

As an elite in the NU, Kiai Nuruddin believed that he had to take a stand on one of the two options – to give support to Megawati-Hasyim or Wiranto-Salahuddin. On August 11 2004, Hasyim, along with twenty kiai – including Kiai Nuruddin, Kiai Masduqi Mahfudz of Mergosono, Malang, and Kiai Idris Marzuki of Lirboyo – visited Syeikh Muhammad bin Alawi bin Abbas Al-Maliki Al-Hasani in Medina. The purpose was clear: they searched for theological justification for a female leadership. Syeikh Muhammad was said to have given valuable advice to his visitors, such as stating that Indonesia is not a country with a caliphate system or imam a’dham (grand imam) and, therefore, it is not a problem if Indonesia has a female president. Based on his advice, the kiai who went to Medina justified their support for Megawati by arguing that the high reputation of Syeikh Muhammad would guarantee the validity of his advice about a fatwā in their country. Kiai Masduqi Mahfudz stated that the visit was purely for ‘umrah, not to seek a fatwā. However, Kiai Nuruddin admitted that he
was aware of the hidden agenda behind the pilgrimage. He claimed that Hasyim in the role as the general chairman of the NU, not as the president candidate had financed the trip. Surprisingly, in an interview with me, he asserted that the kiai who went to the Middle East in fact opposed a female presidential candidate, and stated that they would not support Megawati. He argued that if Hasyim paired with a male candidate, such as Wiranto or Jusuf Kalla, many kiai would surely have endorsed him. Kiai Nuruddin’s political aspirations in the post-Suharto period clearly indicates the pragmatism of religious leaders as power brokers. When beneficial opportunities knock, kiai do not waste them, although they do risk their respected position in society. Kiai’s pragmatism also shows the ability of religious leaders as individuals who are capable of placing themselves in the public eye. They tend to seek secure places among the communities in order not to become trapped in the wrong political choice so that when there is a political change (as it was the case after the Suharto regime collapsed), they know where to voice their political aspirations or they know where the people will voice their political aspirations. The use of religious aspects by leaders in religion is in fact directed at protecting their privileged economic and political positions.

The process of gaining legitimacy from abroad was crucial since many NU followers demanded guidance from their kiai. As one author notes, Islamic political leaders are supposed to act legitimately in their use of power and act for God. Such a leader is able to act in a pragmatic manner, including seeking relations with secular factions if this is believed to advantage the groups he stands for. In the Megawati-Hasyim case, the visit to Medina was said to have generated approval from the prestigious and influenced scholar, which in turn would guarantee popular support from the nahdliyin, although in this case the result was ultimately fruitless because of the confusion over who to elect.

Kiai Nuruddin’s participation in both the NU and Bassra is not regarded as two overlapping tasks. In 2004 presidential election marked a new political orientation. During the Suharto administration, he was known for his supposedly neutral attitude and did not formally join any political party. In Era Reformasi, representing the NU, he was elected as member of the DPD for the period of 2004 to 2009. Kiai Nuruddin is not a product of the New Order. Although his sociopolitical capability was built during that era, it was his choice to be politically neutral while remaining a sympathizer of the PPP that brought him into the national level. For the seat in the DPD, he gained 1,268,498 votes or 7.8 percent from the total of 17,533,390 votes, which placed him in third place after Kiai Mahmud Ali Zain and Kiai Muzib Imron. Kiai Nuruddin’s participation in both the NU and Bassra is not regarded as two overlapping tasks.
fact, the maintenance and renewal of the personal ties he constructed in those organizations have been for his benefit. Moreover, since kiai regard themselves as guides for the commoners, they are continuously required to adjust to new situations in order to maintain their positions. Arguably, Kiai Nuruddin has proved successful at this.

Conclusion

Religious leaders in Indonesia respond in various ways to ideological and political developments, partially because in each area they relate to localized political situations. In present day Indonesia, religious life has not been integrated into the political state, and although a number of religious leaders occupy bureaucratic positions, yet most religious elites in Indonesia are not affiliated with bureaucracy. However, they continue to play important roles in Indonesia.

In Madura, kiai originally emerged as central religious leaders, as well as people’s leaders due to the Dutch colonial administration and the integration of the local secular elite into the foreign power. A Madurese saying “bhuppa ’bhabhu’, ghuru, rato” (parents, teachers – kiai, formal leaders – the state) is suggestive of a constant search for leaders. This has manifested in the mutual relationship between the people and the influential leaders who have successfully maintained their independence from the state. Kiai have been seen as people’s leaders in almost all aspects of Madurese life.

Undoubtedly, kiai are the main actors in the state-society relations in Madura. They have become the cultural, economic, and political brokers – a function which carries its own rewards. By keeping a distance from the state, the kiai have been successful in maintaining their positions in society. They have been aware of the possible risk of being alienated and isolated not only from their followers, but also from their horizontal networks in the religious circle – or more importantly, they are concerned that their high position in society may gradually fade away if they do not keep a distance from the state. For some kiai, utilizing their positions and personalities is a significant way to gain and preserve high positions. Because the regimes in Indonesia seem to shift somewhat easily, others focused on religious matters as a decisive means by which to continuously adapt to changing situations.

The three elements of Madurese Muslim culture – the pesantren, the NU, and the kiai – are tightly connected and integrated into everyday Madurese life. The most central connection is perhaps the tie between the NU and the kiai. The NU has provided the kiai with extensive networks to
link *kiai* to the wider world. The organization has introduced *kiai* so that they can relate their traditions and beliefs – not only those regarding religious devotion, but also in politics and social welfare. In turn, the NU has enjoyed a large following, and this has resulted in their *kiai* being able to attract villagers to vote for the NU and later the PPP, the PKB, and other affiliated parties. The NU and the *kiai* indeed benefit from their followers, the *nahdliyin*. For Madurese people, being a Muslim means being a sympathizer of the NU. However, the strong identification with the NU does not automatically mean that they have to officially become a member of the organization. Followers are born as true *nahdliyin* who will guard the NU’s principles of Sunni Islam and obey the instructions of *kiai*. Thus, in politics, not to vote for the NU parties is a sin. The orthodox thoughts of the NU in Madura have been well preserved by the *kiai* as an ultimate symbol of traditional Islam in Madura, meaning that the *kiai* of the NU are highly regarded among the *nahdliyin*. The NU followers will participate in events organized by NU *kiai* if they know that many renowned *kiai* will also take part. Many of them blindly obey a *kiai*’s words without further questioning the meaning behind a *kiai*’s speech. The level of obedience among the NU followers in Madura to *kiai* of the NU and the NU itself is so high that we might say that the NU has become the “religion” of Madura. The high obedience of the *nahdliyin* to the NU and the *kiai* is definitely a central factor that has led *kiai* in Madura to interact with the political world since the *kiai* know quite well that they will benefit significantly from the *nahdliyin* – not only in the political world, but also in economic well-being.

Despite their traditional features, the *pesantren*, the NU, and the *kiai* that form Madurese Muslim culture have never been an anti-modern force, nor have they been in conflict with democratic conceptions. In fact, these three elements have become identified not only with personal faithfulness, but as social institutions have become more able to adapt to the changing situations within Madurese society. Certainly, *kiai* are well adapted to the modern political world.

*Kiai* Alawy and *Kiai* Nuruddin are only two examples of how Madurese *kiai* have played important roles in society. There are many more *kiai* that have also colored the life of the Madurese. The *kiai* are undoubtedly the ultimate factors in the continuation of the sacred values of the Madurese.

Notes
2. The NU was founded on January 31, 1926 in Surabaya, East Java by a number of the ulama and is by far the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, and claims to have approximately fifty million followers. These are heavily concentrated in Provinces of Central and East Java. See Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, “Indonesia’s approaching elections: politics, Islam, and public opinion,” *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 1 (2004): 111.


5. I use the Indonesian language spelling for all Arabic and Madurese terms to identify their distinctive meanings in society.

6. In the Indonesian languages, such as Javanese, Madurese, and Indonesian (the official language of Indonesia), the term *kiai* and *ulama* can be used as both singular and plural forms. Other non-English terms in this paper can be used as both singular and plural forms as well.


13. The most famous are *rokat desa* and *rokat bandaran*. The former is an annual ritual to bless a village and provide village inhabitants with harmony, safety, and prosperity. The latter is a sea-based feast
to sanctify the fishermen, obtain many fish, and increase safety. Despite a strong association with pre-Islamic belief, religious leaders lead the ceremony. In turn, the religious leaders enjoy a highly respected position among the villagers as well as receiving economical benefits.


15. Kiai Kholil is considered as the most celebrated kiai in the history of Madura. He was born in the first half of the nineteenth century (between 1819 and 1835) and died sometime between 1923 and 1925. He was known not only as a wali (saint), but also as an expert in Arabic letters, as well as a master in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and mystical power. Nowadays a considerable number of Madurese and Javanese kiai consider him their indirect guru, because many leading kiai in Java, such as two of the founders of the NU – Kiai Wahab Hasbullah of Tambakberas, Jombang and Kiai Hasyim Asyari of Tebuireng, Jombang – who studied in his pesantren. Kiai Kholil is still alive in the mind of the Madurese – not only those who live in Madura, but also those outside the island. To many pilgrims, his grave in Bangkalan, Madura is considered as the last of the major places of pilgrimage. Major places of pilgrimage in Indonesia for many pilgrims spread from Banten in the west side of Java to Madura. His grave is considered as the last grave to visit. Usually, although this is not a rule, and exceptions many times do occur; many pilgrims will start do pilgrimage from Banten, and they finish it in his grave in Bangkalan. The pilgrimage is are not done in one day and almost all pilgrims never complete the pilgrimage in one single journey due to the distance. See Zamakhsyari Dhofer, Tradisi pesantren: studi tentang pandangan hidup kiai (Jakarta, Indonesia: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1982); Jajat Burhanudin, “Islamic knowledge, Authority and Political Power: The Kiai in Colonial Indonesia” (PhD diss.. Leiden University, 2007); Martin van Bruinessen, “Tarekat and Tarekat Teachers in Madurese society,” in Across Madura Strait: The Dynamics of an Insular Society, ed. Kees van Dijk, Huub de Jonge, and Elly Touwen-Bouwsma (Leiden, The Netherlands: KITLV Press, 1995) 91–117; Saifur Rachman, Biografi dan karomah Kiai Kholil Bangkalan: surat kepada anjing hitam (Jaktarta, Indonesia: Pustaka Ciganjur, 2001); Mokh. Syaiful Bakhri, Syaichona Kholil Bangkalan: kiai legendaris dari Madura (Pasuruan, Indonesia: Cipta Pustaka Utama, 2006).

16. Except in some areas –such as North Sumatra, North Sulawesi, or Maluku – in general, Indonesians do not have family name.
Therefore, it is very common to write down one’s name as the given (first) name.

17. No one, including Kiai Alawy himself, knows exactly when he was born, as is often the case for many older leading kiai. It is often said that the kiai was born in 1926 when the NU was founded.

18. According to legend, the name is derived from a sakti (possessing magical power) kiai, Kiai Nipah is claimed as the ancestor of the Nipah villagers. His grave was venerated for various purposes (mostly for acquiring wealth) before the site was planned to be drowned by the dam.


26. The other three pairs were Soenarjo-Ali Maschan Moesa, Soetjipto-Ridwan Hisjam, and Achmadi-Soehartono.

27. The NU has been very influential in local politics in Madura. For instance, in the 1971 elections, of the total number of votes in all municipalities in Madura, 817,561 went to the NU party and 300,399 to Golkar – while in East Java province, only 4,379,806 went to the NU, while 6,837,384 went to Golkar. See Panitia Pemilihan Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Timur, Pemilu 1971 di Jawa Timur (Surabaya, Indonesia: Panitia Pemilihan Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Timur, 1971), 170–71. The numbers show us how central the association for the Madurese kiai and also for the Madurese itself.

28. In English, it is known as the Eastern Salient, while in Dutch it is called de Oosthoek.

29. Bassra, established in 1991, consists of kiai who lead pesantren in Madura. The membership is spread all over the island. Kiai Muhammad Kholil AG, a charismatic kiai of Madura from the legendary Kiai Kholil Bangkalan dynasty and Kiai Tijani Jauhari of Pesantren Al-Amien Prenduan, Sumenep from the renowned Kiai Chotib of Sumenep family were the main architects of Bassra. As a nonformal organization, Bassra does not have fixed members. Any kiai pesantren in Madura can join the organization. Kiai Nuruddin claims Bassra has 90 percent of kiai in Madura as its supporters. While Bassra does not have fixed members, it has a Dewan Penasehat (Advisory Council), a Dewan Koordinator Pusat (Central Coordinator Council), a Dewan Koordinator Daerah (Regional Coordinator Council), and a Dewan Perwakilan Bassra (Bassra Representative Council). All councils are represented by Madurese pesantren kiai. Out of the councils, all people involved in Bassra’s activities are identified as participants. Nevertheless, not all kiai pesantren are asked to participate in the organization. The late prominent kiai of the PPP, Kiai Mashduqie Fadly, was one of these examples. In an interview on December 1, 2009, he did not reveal, however, why he was not asked to participate in Bassra.

30. Interviews on November 18, 2009 and December 1, 2009.

31. For instance, Chalid Mawardi, an influential member of the NU opted for Golkar, while Kiai Musta’in Romly of Pesantren Darul Ulum, Jombang became an active spokesperson of Golkar, and even Kiai Abdurrahman Wahid was appointed as a member of the People’s Assembly representing Golkar.

32. Yet, he admitted that the older of his two pesantren once received aid from the government as a result of his victory in a P4 simulation (Pendidikan, Penghayatan, dan Pengamalan Pancasila – the Education, Internalization, and Implementation of Pancasila, a
state doctrine for its citizens as the sole philosophical base of life to adopt) as the best tutor and facilitator of P4 in East Java (Interview with Kiai Nuruddin on December 1, 2009).

33. Imam Nahrowi comes from Konang district in Bangkalan. He and several other members of the East Java local parliament from the PKB faction irregularly donated a small part of their salary to the NU of East Java in early 2000s. Many pundits then made a link between Imam’s support of the NU as support of Kiai Nuruddin. Kiai Nuruddin admitted that he had a close relation with Imam and believed that the closeness was due to the same place of origin (Bangkalan). He claimed that an inadequate lobby to the board of the NU branches was the main factor behind his defeat (Interview on March 4, 2011).


37. There was a story making the rounds among leading kiai of the NU on the Megawati-Hasyim candidacy, which said that on the election day they would mark the picture of Hasyim, not that of Megawati, though both pictures were in the same ballot paper, so that they could claim that they were not in favor of female president.

38. Interview on March 4, 2011


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