In this issue

ARTICLES
Honor-related Violence in the Context of Patriarchy, Multicultural Politics, and Islamophobia after 9/11
Nihan Altınbaş

Contemporary Islamic Educational Discourse and the Philosophy of Empowerment
Yousef Rahath and Rosnani Hashim

The Genesis and Development of the Maqāṣid al-Qur‘ān
Tazul Islam

Islamophobia, Euro-Islam, Islamism, and Post-Islamism: Changing Patterns of Secularism in Europe
Peter O’Brien

BOOK REVIEWS

FORUM

CONFERENCE, SYMPOSIUM, AND PANEL REPORTS
The Association of Muslim Social Scientists of North America (AMSS) is a non-profit membership-based organization that encompasses the United States and Canada. It was established in 1972 for the sole purpose of providing a forum through which Islamic positions on various academic disciplines can be promoted, with an emphasis on the social sciences and humanities.

AMSS has based its activities on the belief that the development of Islamic thought is vital for the prosperity of the Muslim community by bringing together Muslim and non-Muslim scholars in an academic setting to examine and define Islamic perspectives on issues of global concern that contribute to the prosperity of Muslims around the globe and the betterment of humanity.

To encourage emerging Muslim scholars, AMSS established the "Best Graduate Paper Award" competition in 2001 for papers presented at its Annual Conference. AMSS also sponsors regional conferences in the United States and Canada.

In 2008, an "AMSS University Lecture Series" was established to increase the AMSS profile on university campuses and facilitate dialogue opportunities between AMSS scholars and the academy.

Membership in AMSS entitles one to receive The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (AJISS) at no extra cost. AJISS, a blind peer-reviewed interdisciplinary journal, publishes quality original research pertaining to Islam and Muslims.

The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) is a cultural and intellectual foundation. It was established and registered in the United States of America at the beginning of the fifteenth hijri century (1401/1981) with the following objectives:

- To provide a comprehensive Islamic outlook through elucidating the principles of Islam and relating them to relevant issues of contemporary thought.
- To regain the intellectual, cultural, and civilizational identity of the ummah through the Islamization of the humanities and the social sciences.
- To rectify the methodology of contemporary Islamic thought in order to enable it to resume its contribution to the progress of human civilization and give it meaning and direction in line with the values and objectives of Islam.

The institute seeks to achieve its objectives by:

- Holding specialized academic conferences and seminars.
- Supporting and selectively publishing works of scholars and researchers in universities and academic research centers in the Muslim world and the West.
- Directing higher university studies toward furthering work on issues of Islamic thought and the Islamization of Knowledge.

The institute has a number of overseas offices and academic advisors for the purpose of coordinating and promoting its various activities. It has also entered into joint academic agreements with several universities and research centers to implement its objectives.

P.O. Box 669
Herndon, VA 20172-0669 USA
Phone: (703) 471-1133
Fax: (703) 471-3922
E-mail: editor@iiit.org

A joint publication of:
Association of Muslim Social Scientists of North America (AMSS)
&
International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)

Mailing Address:
All correspondence should be addressed to the Editor at:
AJISS, P.O. Box 669, Herndon, VA 20172-0669 USA
Phone: 703-471-1133 ● Fax: 703-471-3922 ● E-mail: ajiss@iiit.org
www.iiit.org / www.amss.org
ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS OF NORTH AMERICA

The Association of Muslim Social Scientists of North America (AMSS) is a nonprofit membership-based organization that encompasses the United States and Canada. It was established in 1972 for the sole purpose of providing a forum through which Islamic positions on various academic disciplines can be promoted, with an emphasis on the social sciences and humanities.

AMSS has based its activities on the belief that the development of Islamic thought is vital for the prosperity of the Muslim world and for the continuity of the Islamic intellectual heritage. AMSS strives to serve the interests of the larger Muslim community by bringing together Muslim and non-Muslim scholars in an academic setting to examine and define Islamic perspectives on issues of global concern that contribute to the prosperity of Muslims around the globe and the betterment of humanity.

To encourage emerging Muslim scholars, AMSS established the “Best Graduate Paper Award” competition in 2001 for papers presented at its Annual Conference. AMSS also sponsors regional conferences in the United States and Canada.

In 2008, an “AMSS University Lecture Series” was established to increase the AMSS profile on university campuses and facilitate dialogue opportunities between AMSS scholars and the academy.

Membership in AMSS entitles one to receive The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (AJISS) at no extra cost. AJISS, a blind peer-reviewed interdisciplinary journal, publishes quality original research pertaining to Islam and Muslims.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT

The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) is a cultural and intellectual foundation. It was established and registered in the United States of America at the beginning of the fifteenth hijri century (1401/1981) with the following objectives:

• To provide a comprehensive Islamic outlook through elucidating the principles of Islam and relating them to relevant issues of contemporary thought.

• To regain the intellectual, cultural, and civilization identity of the ummah through the Islamization of the humanities and the social sciences.

• To rectify the methodology of contemporary Islamic thought in order to enable it to resume its contribution to the progress of human civilization and give it meaningful and direction in line with the values and objectives of Islam.

The institute seeks to achieve its objectives by:

• Holding specialized academic conferences and seminars.

• Supporting and selectively publishing works of scholars and researchers in universities and academic research centers in the Muslim world and the West.

• Directing higher university studies toward furthering work on issues of Islamic thought and the Islamization of Knowledge.

The institute has a number of overseas offices and academic advisors for the purpose of coordinating and promoting its various activities. It has also entered into joint academic agreements with several universities and research centers to implement its objectives.

P.O. Box 669
Herndon, VA 20172-0669 USA
Phone: (703) 471-1133
Fax: (703) 471-3922
E-mail: editor@iiit.org

A joint publication of:
Association of Muslim Social Scientists of North America (AMSS)
&
International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)

Mailing Address:
All correspondence should be addressed to the Editor at:
AJISS, P.O. Box 669, Herndon, VA 20172-0669 USA
Phone: 703-471-1133 ● Fax: 703-471-3922 ● E-mail: ajiss@iiit.org
www.iiit.org / www.amss.org
Note to Contributors

The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (AJISS) is a double blind peer-reviewed and interdisciplinary journal that publishes a wide variety of scholarly research on all facets of Islam and the Muslim world: anthropology, economics, history, philosophy and metaphysics, politics, psychology, religious law, and traditional Islam. Submissions are subject to a blind peer review process.

Submissions must conform to the following guidelines:

• Be the author’s original research. Simultaneous submissions to other journals, as well as previous publication in any format and language, are not accepted.
• Be between 7,000 and 10,000 words in length (shorter articles may be accepted when justified by their exceptionally high quality); book reviews and conference reports must be between 1,000-1,500 words;
• Include a 250 word (max) abstract;
• Cite all bibliographical information in endnotes. Provide full biographical information (e.g., full name(s) of author(s), complete title of the source, place of publication, publishing company, date of publication, and the specific page being cited) when the source is mentioned for the first time. For subsequent citations of the same source, list the author’s last name, abbreviate the title, and give the relevant page number(s). Do not use footnotes or a bibliography;
• Avoid putting the author’s name in headers or footers, and avoid any personal references in the body or the endnotes that might betray their identity to referees;
• Include a cover sheet with the author’s full name, current university or professional affiliation, mailing address, phone/fax number(s), and current e-mail address. Provide a two-sentence biography;
• Transliterate Arabic words according to the style in AJISS, which is based upon that used by the Library of Congress;
• All submissions should be in MS-Word, double-spaced, and on single-sided numbered pages;
• AJISS does not return manuscripts to authors.

AJISS is indexed in the following publications: a) U.M.I. (16 mm microfilm, 35 mm microfilm, 105 mm microfiche for article copies of 1990 issues and after); b) Religion Index One: Periodicals and Index to Book Reviews in Religion (1987 and after). These indexes are part of the ATLA Religion Data-base, available on the WilsonDisc CD-ROM from H. W. Wilson Co., and online via WilsonLine, BRS Information Technologies, and Dialog Information Services; c) Public Affairs Information Service (December 1990 and after); d) Sociological Abstracts - ProQuest (1985 and after); and e) International Current Awareness Services (1992 and after). Selected material is indexed in the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences. Opinions expressed in AJISS are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors or publishers. No photocopying is allowed without the express permission of the publisher. See last page for distributors and subscription rates.

The TranslitLS, TranslitSBL and TranslitLSAKK fonts used to create this work are © 1994-2002 Payne Loving Trust. They are available from Linguist’s Software, Inc., www.linguist-software.com, PO Box 580, Edmonds, WA 98020-0580 USA, tel (425) 775-1130.

© The International Institute of Islamic Thought
ISSN 0742-6763
## CONTENTS

### Editorial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honor-related Violence in the Context of Patriarchy, Multicultural Politics, and Islamophobia after 9/11</td>
<td>Nihan Altınbaş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Islamic Educational Discourse and the Philosophy of Empowerment</td>
<td>Yousef Rahath and Rosnani Hashim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Genesis and Development of the Maqāṣid al-Qur’ān</td>
<td>Tazul Islam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia, Euro-Islam, Islamism, and Post-Islamism: Changing Patterns of Secularism in Europe</td>
<td>Peter O’Brien</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Book Reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observing the Observer: The State of Islamic Studies in American Universities</td>
<td>Usaama al-Azami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Approaches to the Qur’an and Sunnah</td>
<td>Usaama al-Azami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toward our Reformation: From Legalism to Value-oriented Islamic Law and Jurisprudence</td>
<td>David L. Johnston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Qur’anic Worldview: A Springboard for Cultural Reform</td>
<td>Saheed Ahmad Rafai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History</td>
<td>Mojtaba Ebrahimian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Diaspora in the West: Negotiating Gender, Home, and Belonging</td>
<td>Anna Piela</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Islam and Christianity: Theological Themes in Comparative Perspective
(by John Renard)
Sophia Rose Shafi .............................................................................................................113

Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States
(by Adam Hanieh)
Junaid S. Ahmad .............................................................................................................117

Herbal Medicine in Yemen: Traditional Knowledge and Practice, and
Their Value for Today’s World
(by Ingrid Hehmeyer and Hanne Schönig, eds.)
John Andrew Morrow ...................................................................................................119

Forum

Hallaq’s Challenge: Can the Shari’ah Save Us from Modernity?
Ovamir Anjum ...............................................................................................................124

Did Pakistanis Vote for the Status Quo?
Omer Bin Abdullah .......................................................................................................135

Conference, Symposium, and Panel Reports

Jewish Revival and Respect for Islam in Nineteenth-Century Europe
Jay Willoughby ..............................................................................................................150

Reading the Qur’an Contextually
Jay Willoughby ..............................................................................................................153
Editorial

Ibn Hazm’s Legal Contribution

In profiling Ibn Hazm, the previous editorial shed some light on his genealogy, early life and education, and breadth of knowledge. In this issue, I concentrate only on his legal dimensions.

A Shot at a Political Career?

Ibn Hazm’s childhood of luxury ended abruptly when his family estate was destroyed in 1013 and the family fled to Jativa. Like his father, Ibn Hazm’s early career began in political arena. Sympathetic to the the Umayyads, he was imprisoned after Sulayman’s overthrow in 1016.\(^1\) A few years later, however, Abd al-Rahman IV al-Murtada appointed Ibn Hazm his vizier, which caused him to fight in the battle of Granada. In 1023, released after years in jail, he returned to Cordoba and, in 1023, was again appointed vizier by Abd al-Rahman V al-Mustazhir. Seven weeks later the caliph was murdered and Ibn Hazm was again imprisoned. Upon his release, he became an academic and withdrew from political and public life.\(^2\)

Legal Works and Ideas

He began to study jurisprudence at the age of twenty-six, when he was publicly shamed by not knowing “how to restore (\textit{ajbur}) any of the daily prayers,” did not know how to perform the “greeting of the mosque” prayer, and was unaware that it was not done before sunset. He immediately sought out Abu Abd Allah ibn Dahhun (d. 1030), who “showed me to the \textit{Muwaṭṭa}’ of Malik ibn Anas which I begun to read on the next day. And I continued to study from him and others for about three years, and [thereafter,] I started to debate.”\(^3\)

Although he was first exposed to Maliki jurisprudence, there is no evidence that he wrote any books based on it. As a scholar who valued intellectual independence, he found the school’s “insistence on unquestioning obedience to authority (\textit{taqlid}),” quite unsettling and eventually joined the Shafi’i school, which he considered more liberal. During this time he wrote \textit{Kitāb al-Muhallā bi al-Āthār},\(^4\) an abridgement of his earlier \textit{Al-Mujallā}. Brockelmann refers to the full title as \textit{Kitāb al-Muhallā bil’Āthār fi Sharḥ al-Mujallā bil Iqtiṣār (Ikhtiṣār)}.\(^5\) Ibn Hazm apparently wrote \textit{Al-Muhallā} to simplify \textit{Al-Mujallā}, for:
its understanding would be simple for the student and the beginner, and
would serve for him as a ladder to becoming knowledgeable in debate, dis-
agreement and correction of proofs that lead to the knowledge of truth.6

Ibn Hazm felt uncomfortable with some Shafi’i principles (e.g., *qiyyas* and
*ra’y*), and therefore moved to the the Zahiri school, whose principles he de-
lineated in *Al-Ihkām li Uṣūl al-Aḥkām*. But his reason for doing so may have
been dictated by various intellectual and historical considerations.

At a time of ethical and social imbalance, Andalusia’s religious scholars
were driven by greed for wealth and lust for higher status, and thus were the
chief supporters of the “party kings’” (*mulūk al-ṭawā’if*) quest for authority
and attitude to injustice. By now an expert in Maliki and Shafi’i law, Ibn Hazm
realized that these scholars abused *qiyyas* and used it to legitimize the rulers’
actions rather than uphold Islam’s fundamentals. Consequently, he adopted
Zahirism and waged an intellectual war against the other schools.7

By becoming a Zahiri he could also work to accomplish his initial political
goals. Unable to restore his society’s well-being through its leaders, he turned
to Zahiri-based jurisprudence as a way to restore the people’s social, economic,
and moral life. By ensuring that its principles were rightly founded, the impact
would encompass all aspects of life including, perhaps, political life.

**Zahiriyah (Literalism): Principles**

Although Ibn Hazm developed and elaborated principles of Zahiriyah (a
school founded several decades earlier by Abu Sulayman Dawud ibn Ali al-
Isbahani, d. 884), how he defined it is unclear. R. Strothmann defines it as “a
school of law, which would drive the law only from the literal text (*zāhir*) of
the Kur’ān and Sunna.”8 But Ibn Hazm understood it as a methodology that
could be applied to law, theology, and any discipline in which he engaged
himself. His strong efforts to elucidate Zahiri doctrine culminated in his *Al-
Ihkām fi Uṣūl al-Aḥkām* and *Al-Fiṣal fi al-Milal wa al-Ahwā’ wa al-Nīḥal*.

For Ibn Hazm, Zahiritism signified:

bypassing obscure and esoteric meaning and going to that which is obvious
and apparent by itself, which can be discovered instinctively by the intellect
through spoken language and the understanding of its meaning, by the use
of what is customary, and under the auspices of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah.9

The principles of his methodology are identified as:

1. Commitment to the text (Qur’ān and Sunna) within the confines of the
   literal meaning, based on what the obvious (*wādīḥ*) language indicates.
2. Recognition and acceptance of the Companions’ consensus as a source of religious legislation, as well as rejection of the principles of analogy, application of preference (istihsān), imitation, causation, etc.

3. Citing the opponent’s arguments and avoiding as much as possible putting words in their mouths.

4. Holding all the Companions at the same level of authority; and although the opinions of some of them can be followed and others’ rejected, there is no inherent authority for some over others when they disagree.

5. Giving all the leaders of the schools of law the same consideration without attaching any superiority to any of them.

6. Giving attention to several sources, but only citing the names when uses them as evidence, such as al-Bukhari, and Malik.

7. No authority for the many as long as there is a dissenting voice.

8. More reliance on the Companions’ actions than their sayings that are based on the Prophetic Traditions.10

It is observed that most of the principles that Zahirism challenged, and through which it became distinguished, were of a legal nature (e.g., qiyās and taqlīd).11 Hence, a selective discussion on consensus and analogy follows.

**Consensus (Ijmā’)**

Islamic jurisprudence considers consensus, defined in essence as all Muslim individuals or scholars agreeing on a specific legal rule based on specific texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah, a source of Islamic law. Ibn Hazm, who approves of this, rejects the idea of consensus based on collective opinion in the absence of any supporting Qur’anic text or sunnah of the Prophet. For him, Qur’an 4:59’s injunction to obey the religious and political leaders does not override the command to obey God and the Prophet. Hence, scholars can neither issue opinions nor agree on certain issues (which act would be binding) without basing themselves on the Qur’an and Sunnah.

He stated that only the Companions’ consensus was binding, for they had seen Muhammad establish Islam. Moreover, they were all Muslims, something that cannot be said of any subsequent generation, and so only their consensus is truly reliable. Also, they were easily identifiable, as was everything they said and believed. Hence, the possibility of real consensus belongs to them alone.12

Ibn Hazm asserts that no one needs to explain the nature of consensus. This certain consensus (al-mutayaqqan) is two types: (1) that which is beyond doubt and thus all Muslims believe (e.g., the shahādah and the obligatory five daily prayers) and (2) what all the Companions witnessed the Prophet say or do, or what he was known to have done with certainty by those who were absent (e.g., his decision to allow Khaybar’s Jews to go into exile).13
Ibn Hazm is unique here in restricting consensus to the Companions, rejecting their consensus if there is even one dissenting voice, and ignoring the consensus of a particular place (e.g., Madinah or Kufa).

**Analogy (Qiyās)**

Rejecting analogy as a source of jurisprudence is perhaps the signature doctrine of Ibn Hazm’s Zahiri system. According to other schools, analogy, like consensus, is a “source” of law “through” which a legal rule can be derived or reached in the absence of a directly pertinent Qur’anic or Sunnah text dealing with a particular issue that may share the same basic cause (‘illa) with an available text. Ibn Hazm vehemently objects to this practice:

> The Zahiris reject analogy ... and say one cannot rule – in anything at all – except on the basis of a text from the Qur’an or the Hadith, through an authenticated deeds or affirmation (iqrār), or through a consensus of all Muslim scholars, with the certainty that there was absolutely no dissent.

According to him, other schools use three types of analogy: (1) “the most similar and suitable” (al-ashbah wa al-awlā), in which a decision of a known ruling is applied to another unknown, due to a high degree of similarity between them, such as applying a couple’s separation due to the lack of sexual intercourse to a husband who does not support his wife; (2) “the similar” (almithl), such as al-Shafi’i’s claim that a vessel used by a dog must be washed seven times can be applied to a vessel used by a pig; and (3) “the least similar” (al-adnā), as in case between urine and blood. Ibn Hazm views this typology as nothing but a collection of controversies (shaghab) falsified by the adherents of the other schools.

He opines that, initially, there was no obligation (ijāb) or forbidding (tahrīm) in religion. After God sent down His legislation, however, whatever He ordered, forbade, or was silent about became, respectively, obligatory, forbidden, and absolutely permissible (mubāh muṭlaq) and thus allowed halāl. Hence, “there is no way (sabiil) at all for a fourth type [to exist],” and therefore no need for analogy. He ridicules the opinion that analogy can be done by taking the original (asl) and applying it to the “branch” (far’) in Islamic law, and so concludes that “all religious rulings are original and there is no branch’, and all have texts.”

Although his concepts could not place the Zahiri school on an equal footing with the others in terms of following and application, nor to enable it to survive as a distinct school, he did leave his mark on Islamic jurisprudence. I hope to address his theological views in the coming issues.
This Issue

Over the years, the third volume of the year has been viewed as a “special issue.” This issue is an exception; this year’s “special issue” will be 30:4.

We open with Nihan Altınbaş’ “Honor-related Violence in the Context of Patriarchy, Multicultural Politics, and Islamophobia after 9/11.” Altınbaş attempts to contextualize this violence in relation to patriarchy and a society’s economic wellbeing, to migratory experience in terms of multicultural politics and, finally, to critiques of its use in post-9/11 misrepresentations of Islam. She argues that the global phenomenon of honor-related violence is shaped not by religion, but by unequal power relations and patriarchal domination.

Yousef Rahath and Rosnani Hashim’s “Contemporary Islamic Educational Discourse and the Philosophy of Empowerment” proposes a new conceptual framework for empowerment in lieu of the traditional views, which see it in terms of infrastructural development or shifting power from the powerful to the powerless. They argue that any process of education that seeks to empower people must provide the fundamental freedom and resources so that the students can understand the world and thereby acquire the ability to change it.

In “The Genesis and Development of the Maqāṣid al-Qur’ān,” Tazul Islam explores the genesis and conceptual developments of this new academic field by analyzing its roots and how it has fared over time. He concludes that (1) it has achieved the status of a “specific science” that could be presented to the public in a compact form; and (2) although hardly any theoretical work appears in the very early studies of the Qur’an, surely those early authors understood the maqāṣid both in theory and in practice, for the all-exclusive changes occurring at that time reflected them.

We close with Peter O’Brien’s “Islamophobia, Euro-Islam, Islamism, and Post-Islamism: Changing Patterns of Secularism in Europe.” O’Brien contends that ideological elements of Islamism, Islamophobia and Euro-Islam have all found their way into policymaking processes in several European lands, targeting Muslims and resulting in “policy messiness” and “mutual fragilization.” He insists on a fourth ideological position, “post-Islamism,” which can freely and constructively explore cross-fertilizations and has the potential for creative hybridity among a younger generation of European Muslims.

I hope that our readers will find these papers thought-provoking, stimulating, and sources of inspiration and motivation for their own research.

Endnotes


11. Ibn Hazm, Al-Iḥkām fi-Ūṣūl al-Aḥkām (Cairo: Matba’at al-Sa’ada, 1926), 4:128 and 147. “However,” Chejne observes, “Ibn Hazm does not close the door to agreement reached by the Companions’ successors, provided that they conform to the truth and based on evidence which resides in the Qur’ān and the authenticated Traditions.” Chejne, Ibn Hazm, 114.


16. Ibid., 7:55. Some of the translations on the types of analogy are taken from Chejne, Ibn Hazm, 126.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

Zaky Ibrahim, Editor
Comparative Religion Department
California State University, Fullerton, CA
zibrahim@fullerton.edu
Honor-related Violence in the Context of Patriarchy, Multicultural Politics, and Islamophobia after 9/11

Nihan Altınbaş

Abstract

Many women are exposed to domestic and/or sexual violence by their family members on a global scale, forced to marry before reaching maturity, mutilated for the sake of preserving their chastity, and deprived of their right to education and of any inheritance rights. Honor-related violence is an extreme, worldwide form of violence that after 9/11 has been increasingly associated with Islam, as if it were perpetrated only by Muslims living either in diaspora communities or in Muslim-majority countries. This stereotyping has lent ideological support to unequal power relations that have been shaped mainly by western economic interests since colonialism. This essay contextualizes honor-related violence in relation to patriarchy and a society’s economic wellbeing, to migratory experience in terms of multicultural politics and, finally, to critiques its use in post-9/11 misrepresentations of Islam. It argues that unequal power relations and patriarchal domination, as opposed to religion, shape this global phenomenon.

Introduction

As a term, honor-related violence encompasses a wide range of violations of women’s human rights and crimes committed in the name of honor. Various forms of domestic violence, forced marriages, and vendettas count among honor crimes. Honor-related violence also encompasses crimes of passion, during which a husband kills his wife upon witnessing or suspecting adultery...

Nihan Altınbaş is a Ph.D. Candidate in the History Department at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey.
on her part. Crimes in the name of honor reach their extreme when a woman is murdered by her family members if she is suspected of having violated the social norms that regulate sexuality.

However, interpretation of the concept of violating honor-related sexual norms is quite ambiguous, in that it ranges from dating to flirting, having an extramarital affair, getting pregnant, and even to being raped. In any of these cases, other members of a woman’s family may decide to have her murdered or force her to commit suicide because such events are believed to destroy the family’s honor-based status. However, accusations brought against women could be merely a matter of gossip. In some societies, loss of honor can also mean incurring material losses. It is believed that the male members of a family that has lost its honor-related status will be unable to make good marriages. This also increases the burden on the female family members, in that their lives and behavior are kept under strict surveillance and control.

John Peristiany argued that in the patriarchal social system, honor and shame are crucial elements in defining a man’s claim to pride and acknowledgement in society. In this system, certain roles are ascribed to women, and their bodies are understood to be repositories of male honor and property. Actually, the problem of honor-related violence is one of patriarchal societies, in which women are viewed as servants to their families, both physically and symbolically. Hence, an unchaste or adulterous woman puts her male relatives’ lineage rights in danger, as there is a possibility that she may give birth to an illegitimate child. Therefore, any violation of a man’s property would end in severe punishment for women, such as honor-related violence, under the patriarchal system. From time to time, however, men may also be the victims of such violence.

This type of violence is also related to the society’s economic wellbeing, as there is an inverse relationship between the level of prosperity and the frequency of honor-related violence. In prosperous societies, those who are accused of transgressing moral norms receive relatively mild punishments, such as being kept under observation or forced to marry to the person with whom the crime was committed. However, when a society’s prosperity level is low and some groups grow poorer than others, the relatively poor people frequently become more conservative and attach greater value to their moral norms and traditions. These people usually display no tolerance toward those who commit such offences and they are, therefore, are usually punished severely.

According to the UN’s Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment for Women and the Muslim Women’s League, honor-related violence is preva-
lent in almost all societies with patriarchal attributes, whether western or eastern. There are similar patterns of family honor in Latin American and Mediterranean societies, among Kurds and Bedouins of the Middle East, within various Indian castes, and in China. Instances of honor-related violence have been observed among Muslims, Christians, Jews, Yezidis, Druze, Sikhs, and Hindus, as well as among people not professing any religion. More specifically, historical and legal documents point to the fact that this type of violence is seen in Israel, Russia, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador and China, Italy, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slovenia, Egypt and Kenya, Jordan, Central Asia and India. The statistics below further highlight the issue:

In the year 1993, 14,500 women were killed and 56,000 women were exposed to violence in Russia. In the same year, it was reported that 42% of women were subjected to domestic violence by their husbands in Kenya. In the year 1990, 4825 women were killed during fraternal fights emerging from inheritance problems in India. In Canada, 18% of women between 18 and 64 claimed that they had been sexually exploited by their family members before they were 16. 5% of women claimed that they had been raped, and 27% had been molested by their boyfriends.

Thus, honor-related violence is found across all religions and faiths on a global scale.

However, the trend toward associating honor-related violence with Muslims has increased, together with the rise of Islamophobia that developed rapidly after 9/11: A growing number of Islamophobic organizations in North America and Europe, as well as a great many reports in the Western media, tend to label any murder occurring among Muslims as ‘honor-related violence,’ even when no honor dynamics are involved. Although the rates of rape, sexual harassment, and murder are high in North America and Europe, the media singles out Muslim and other immigrant communities for perpetrating honor-related violence.

Honor-related issues are exclusive to patriarchy. However, patriarchy cannot be totally decoupled from religion. An embedded ideological discourse within many religious traditions, whether monotheist or not, enforces patriarchal gender relations to varying levels. In fact, it is misleading to stereotype Islam as innately more patriarchal than Christianity and Judaism, and to envision honor-related violence to be an issue exclusive to Islam. However, the reified political discourses and media coverage of Islam and Muslims blur the explanation of honor-related violence dynamics. Exploration of this violence
requires an in-depth analysis of patriarchy, the prosperity levels of a society, the experiences of immigration and multiculturalism, and paying attention to the Islamophobic tendency of blaming all ills on Islam.

Patriarchy and Honor-related Violence

Patriarchy is a system of social structures and practices that institutionalizes male power over women and children in the family. In such societies, women are devalued and relegated to a lower status than that of men. This institutionalized male dominance and even oppression over women is also extended in the society. In the ensuing hierarchical order, standards of honorable behavior for men and women also differ. Men are expected to actively protect the dignity of their families by controlling and even oppressing their female family members and relatives. However, whether it is a kinship group, a village, a region, a class or a caste, women are the bearers of group identity in patriarchal social structures and thus should always be chaste and pure for their families.

Via employing the honor/shame rhetoric, patriarchal social structures try to keep group boundaries closed. To demarcate the group’s boundaries, a woman’s integrity must be safeguarded. For instance, in the Hindu caste system a woman is responsible for her caste’s purity and her adultery might introduce impure blood into the lineage. In Sri Lanka, women may not have sexual relations with lower caste men, as they are believed to become irreversibly polluted as a result. Likewise, in nineteenth-century Cuba women were agents of transmitting family attributes through generations, and the mixing of races via marriage or an extra-marital affair would bring dishonor to a family.

The patriarchal social order is kept intact through the use of coercion and force over women. Forcing women to marry before reaching adulthood, beatings, preventing access to higher education, and/or not allowing them to work and earn their own money, and denying them their property rights are other means of reproducing the established patriarchal order. However, paradoxically, such a society’s values are internalized by its female members, who continuously transfer them to future generations.

Patriarchy, like all other hierarchical systems, is intrinsically built on the judicious use of actual or implied violence. Although it favors men over women, this does not mean that all men are equal or that men are not expected to refrain from harming the honor of other men. Hence crimes of honor are assumed to be legitimately punishable offences. For instance, the Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that during 1998-97, men were killed together with 158 women in *karo-kari* homicides. Yet women suffer disproportionately and are always punished even in circumstances where men may not be, as in cases of incest and family rape.

Throughout recorded history, women have been treated unfavorably in patriarchal societies. For example, the legal and historical history of the Mediterranean Basin reveals a great deal about the relationship between the influence of patriarchal culture and honor-related violence. A certain notion of honor – the loss of which is associated with female sexuality and impurity – has existed in almost all Mediterranean societies. According to William Ian Miller and Victoria Goddard, a man’s honor in this region has consisted of making sure that his female family members and relatives remained pure.

However, the content and significance of honor in this region has varied and undergone crises. Socioeconomic events after the Second World War and at the end of the region’s fascist regimes impacted the understanding of honor. For instance, in Spain, a belief in the old pre-modern sense honor is now confined to elderly Francoist and Catholic conservatives of Castile, Andalucía, the Basque country, and to Gypsies. Similarly, northern Italy has seen no vendettas and honor-related issues for quite some time, although such violence continues to exist in the center and south of the country as a lingering ghost of the past.

Patriarchy is intrinsically built on the judicious use of actual or implied violence. In fact, the Greek, Spanish, and Italian penal codes used to recognize honor as a mitigating factor in crimes of violence, including homicide. In the contemporary Spanish penal code, a special title of *honoria causa* (a crime committed for the sake of honor) is still reserved for a husband who kills his adulterous wife. Similarly, the Italian penal code of 1889 accepted honor as a mitigating factor, as it was believed that an adulterous woman caused a psychological disturbance in her male relatives. From 1968-69, a new set of arrangements made honor an issue of civil law. Under the new civil law, adultery by either a woman or a man was accepted as a reason to grant divorce, with material sanctions imposed on the guilty party.

As explored above, honor-related violence is closely tied to and historically rooted in persistent forms of patriarchy. The Austin Report (2009) mentioned this system as the main reason for honor-related violence and emphasized that no religion approves of such violence. However, the typical media coverage of honor-related violence and honor killings overempha-
sizes religion’s role\textsuperscript{55} and fails to examine the socioeconomic context, multicultural politics, and rise of Islamophobia as they relate to his particular form of violence.

**Economic Wellbeing and Honor-related Violence**

In economically prosperous and democratically administered societies, a family’s honor and social position is not considered as being either made or broken by how its female members behave,\textsuperscript{56} although such societies may have patriarchal attributes. In those societies, it is difficult to observe honor-related violence because women have economic power and the security provided by specific laws that protect them.\textsuperscript{57} In fact, Lynn Welchmann and Sara Hossain argue that almost all legal arrangements favor men over women regarding domestic violence and the physical force that women face.\textsuperscript{58} However, in relatively prosperous countries the position of women is made relatively stronger through the passing of criminal laws that protect them from violence.\textsuperscript{59}

In both the poor parts of prosperous societies and the underdeveloped areas of modernizing states, incomes are low, formal education is lacking, and upward mobility is almost impossible.\textsuperscript{60} In those societies, while honor-related violence is rare among the educated and urbane, among the poorer and less-educated people it is a common occurrence. For instance, among the Middle East’s Kurdish and Arabic tribal societies, both of which have long traditions of self-administered justice, honor-related violence and killings are frequent. The chastity of a woman belonging to such a tribal society defines her family’s honor and status, and women are expected to adhere strictly to the moral norms of their group, be they ethnically or religiously defined.

Contemporary socioeconomic determinants and experience of migration also impact the understanding of honor. The religious, ethnic, gender, and class dynamics of the country and the immigrants’ position within it impact the dynamics of honor-related violence.\textsuperscript{61} In some European countries, honor-related violence can be seen as an indicator of the social exclusion and poverty of migrant families, who usually survive on low incomes and experience unemployment. The immigrant families among which honor-related violence is observed are often poor and socially excluded. The authors of the *Resource Book for Working against Honor-Related Violence*\textsuperscript{62} stated that such families’ low income levels negatively impacts the men’s status and power, given that they are supposed to provide for their families. Consequently, their
loss of status within the family also turns into increased oppression of the female members.

When the process of integration into the host country is slow, belonging to a group identity serves as a security or social welfare system and leads migrant families to become even more conservative and enforce their original culture’s traditional patriarchal aspects within their communities. For instance, Fadime Şahindal, a Kurdish migrant to Sweden, was murdered by her family for having a Swedish boyfriend. Before she was killed, she told the Swedish Parliament that if Swedish society had accepted and helped her family, her situation might have been avoided.

The fear of losing their identity also makes migrants more introverted, in that they tend to stick to their traditional and patriarchal values and norms. The risk that young female family members may adopt the host country’s lifestyle, values, and norms alarms families. The authors of the Resource Book for Working against Honor-Related Violence notes that for a migrant man, controlling the sexuality of his female family members and keeping them under control means receiving respect from others and having access to certain rights in the group to which he belongs. In fact, many traditional, cultural beliefs and practices may become stricter in the diaspora than they are at home. Hence, in migrant communities, females are strictly controlled and any honor-related “misdeed” is punished, as in the case of Fadime Şahindal.

In some of the media discussions and public debates in Canada, Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, honor-related violence is linked not to the economic situation or social status of Muslim migrants, but to their religion. Negative stereotypes are produced to blame Islam for all sorts of honor-related violence. Rather than searching for the real reasons, Muslims are openly blamed in the discourse frequently encountered in some of these countries’ media outlets. Governments and certain political forces offer immigration controls and assimilation policies as a solution. However, the employment of such policies and the multicultural rhetoric in some European countries hinders finding a real solution to the problem, which needs further exploration.

**Honor-related Violence and Multicultural Politics**

Multicultural politics have been employed by some western societies to build cultures of tolerance and equality for all citizens. The politics of multicultural identity legitimize people’s differences and uniqueness in the public as well
as in the private spheres.\textsuperscript{68} However, the states that apply these policies usually do not deem it necessary to establish a space in which various groups and ethnicities can coexist.\textsuperscript{59} Hence, multicultural policies may cause people of different origins to stay away from each other. The ongoing debates on multicultural identity politics have centered on the presumed incompatibility between western and Muslim religious values, as though the Muslims living in Europe or North America were a single homogenous entity. Issues of gender in Islam have been discussed to show this alleged incompatibility.\textsuperscript{70}

However, such violations of women’s rights in Europe and in North America as sexual harassment, beatings\textsuperscript{71} and rape are found among almost all groups.\textsuperscript{72} According to Mikael Kurkiala, the number of women killed in honor killings committed by Muslim migrants is minute when compared to the number of women killed by ethnically Swedish men.\textsuperscript{73} Yet according to the results of one study, Dutch and German media outlets portray honor-related violence as directly stemming from Islam.\textsuperscript{74} Quite frequently, they present the predicament of a Muslim woman either positively (e.g., if she is assimilated) or with negative overtones directed against her community’s religious and cultural milieu.\textsuperscript{75}

Multiculturalism as a policy faces some valid criticisms in Europe, one of which is the toleration of violence or abuse against migrant women under the guise of cultural difference. According to Archana Agarwal, this policy’s moral relativism is also a challenge for international human rights standards.\textsuperscript{76} On December 20, 1993, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) decided that member states were responsible for preventing violence against women and that states must protect the victims of such violence. In Beijing in 1995, attendees at the UN meeting decided that the culture, tradition, or religion of any migrant cannot be accepted as an excuse for any state not to protect its women from domestic or honor-related violence. However, the situation of migrant woman with regard to honor-related violence has not changed drastically, despite the solutions offered by the UN.

What seems to be happening is that “western values” have become conflated with “universal human values,” with the subtle implication that Islam fails to respect basic human rights. Nevertheless, this judgment frequently leads to an outrage against Islam’s “barbaric cultural practices” and motivates liberals and elite feminists to save the poor Muslim women from their terrible prison.\textsuperscript{77} However, in such a situation the culprit chosen is not the general system of patriarchy that victimizes migrant women, but rather Islam. It should be acknowledged that there are multiple Muslim discourses, all of which are affected by gender, class, and degree of piety. Blaming Islam and Muslims
for honor-based violence is a result of Islamophobic ignorance, which was aggravated after 9/11.

**Honor-related Violence and Islamophobia after 9/11**

Islamophobia is the fear that Islam threatens the established western order. According to this type of thinking, Islam is backward, inferior, and hostile toward modernization and western values. The period after 9/11 has seen the stigmatization of Islam by equating it also with such cultural practices as arranged marriages, female genital mutilation, and the violation of women’s rights. This situation has been boosted by the increasing amount of media attention given to the oppression of women and human rights violations in some Muslim countries in an exaggerated manner.

One result of this approach has been that Muslims who were previously identified according to their national or regional origin (e.g., Pakistani, Saudi, Iranian, Indonesian, and Moroccan) are now commonly represented as if they were an internally unified and homogenous entity. After 9/11, a large section of the mainstream media in Europe and North America have increasingly overlooked the diversity of Islamic communities and attributed negative characteristics (e.g., being oppressive, barbaric, and misogynist) almost to all Muslims. As a result, honor-related violence became the focal point of difference and incompatibility between Muslim migrants and westerners. In fact, after 9/11 some of the western audience became more inclined to believe that Muslims are prone to terrorism, as they are perceived as extremists capable of murder in cases of honor concerns. Hence, equating Muslims and their cultures with the risk of terrorism, bigotry, and honor-related violence has boosted intolerance toward Muslims in Europe and North America.

Honor-related violence is conceived within a largely orientalist framework, which enables one to equate Islam with terror and backwardness. However, Gayatri-Chakravorty Spivak argues that western intellectual thought is, in many ways, complicit with western international economic interests. After all, during colonial times the colonial administrators tried to persuade local populations that they were backward, primitive, and needed the colonizers’ modernizing, civilizing mission to exploit the indigenous resources indefinitely and without compensation. In order for the West to claim moral superiority over bigotry and backwardness of the rest, its colonial and missionary cadres problematized polygyny in Africa, widow immolation in India, and veiling in North Africa and the Middle East. The colonial narrative depicted local women as being in need of rescue from the “local, brutal, brown
men” and such barbaric traditions as sati, child marriage, and foot binding. As such, the image of the white man as “the saviour of local woman” was produced and legitimized the colonial powers’ existence and exploitative administration in those lands.

Apart from legitimizing its existence in the colonies, the colonial administration also left its mark on the ex-colonies’ legal cultures. For instance, the laws of most of the once-colonized French nations excuse honor-related violence. However, it is also argued that those laws are derived from the Napoleonic Code, the 324th article of which reads that a husband may be excused for murdering his wife if she has committed adultery. Hence, according to Rochelle Terman, in the colonized lands the Napoleonic law became entangled with local and tribal customs and eventually became a tool to justify social norms that exploit women.

Like the colonial image of “brutal brown men,” the idea of the “violent Muslim man” has also been produced by means of various post-9/11 literary and academic works. Many documentaries, short films, and novels give undue credibility, at least in the minds of the European and American publics, to the link between honor-related violence and Islam. According to such works, the colonial era’s emblematic images of eastern backwardness – the veil and sati – have now been replaced by honor-related violence.

However, the “terrorist Muslim” stereotype strengthens the conservative and racist backlash in the United States and Europe and inevitably makes the lives of their Muslims difficult. For instance, Liz Fekete explains that after 9/11 the German government proposed establishing a centralized population register in which data on third-country nationals living in the EU would be stored. This process was incorporated into the European Council’s anti-terrorism roadmap and led to the introduction of a new system of alerts on the Schengen Information System. In the United Kingdom, the media and parliamentary meetings speak of Muslim migrants as if they were the country’s most serious problem. Similarly, Elizabeth Poole’s research from 1994-2003 on how two important British newspapers, the Guardian and the Times, have covered British Muslims concludes that “Muslims are a threat to security in the UK due to their affiliation with terrorism, or a threat to British mainstream values, or create tensions in interpersonal relations due their cultural differences with the host community.”

The popularity of honor-related violence in the media and its presumed link with Islam is very much related to recent political developments. For instance, during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the United States used its media outlets as tools of ideological and moral justification. The attention
placed on the Afghan woman’s predicament was remarkable, in that it was only when the Taliban’s rule collided with British and American interests that the media of both countries paid special attention to it. The image of “the white man as the saviour of brown/local woman” is reproduced through the media: In the twenty-first century, the western man has become the savior of Muslim women from the burden of traditions and honor-related violence. Additionally, the accompanying media campaign played a key role in ensuring the rhetoric of the violations of women’s rights and honor-related violence to legitimize the invasion.

Patriarchy affects fundamentalist interpretations of the Bible, the Torah, and the Qur’an. However, most western patriarchal and conservative fundamentalist figures behave as if there is no honor-related violence in western societies or that domestic violence and murder of women does not occur among white western people. Actually, the Qur’an, the prophetic practice, and Islamic law do not sanction honor-related violence. Besides, lately, reputable Islamic scholars and clerics have spoken out against such violence and have issued a religious decree banning it. However, presenting this type of violence as an exclusively Muslim issue only contributes to the Islamophobic perspective, which turns religious differences in the post-colonial period into racial differences in the modern world.

Conclusion

According to Goddard, honor is not a historical value that has been superseded by modernity and rationality. Although societies’ socioeconomic and cultural dynamics have changed over time, remnants of the honor-based way of thinking and honor-related violence can still be observed in any society with patriarchal origins; however, the now appear under different titles. But after 9/11, most media outlets have increasingly presented honor-related violence as a practice exclusive to Muslims living in diaspora communities in Europe or in Muslim-majority countries, thereby falsely associating honor-related violence only with Islam.

The reified discourses about Islam and Muslims blur the explanation of honor-related violence dynamics. This violence, which is so closely tied to the persistent forms of patriarchy, should be explored along with a society’s level of prosperity, experiences of immigration, and multiculturalism. But any such study would be incomplete if one final factor was not considered: the Islamophobic tendency to blame all ills on Islam. As my discussion shows, the Islamic world is not simply misogynist and all European cultures and tradi-
tions are not completely devoid of honor-related violence stemming from patriarchy. Women are continuously being victimized as a result of honor-related violence globally; and ways to challenge this form of patriarchal domination must be found without being blurred by reified discourses of Islamophobia and/or political ideologies.

Endnotes


3. In southeastern and eastern Turkey, where the Kurdish population mostly lives, the number of women committing suicide is high. According to Cengiz Yıldız, those suicides should be considered within the honor-related dynamics of the people living in those regions. See Cengiz Yıldız, “İntihar Bir Töre Cinayeti mi?” International Symposium on the Sociologic and Legal Dimensions of Honor-Related Murder, Diyarbakır, Turkey, 26–27 September 2003.


Altnbaş: Honor-related Violence

(“Committing Suicide or Being a Victim of Honor-Related Murder: Are they Different Results of a Same Pressure on Women’s Sexuality in Similar Contexts?”). Available at: http://www.huksam.hacettepe.edu.tr/Turkce/SayfaDosya/namus_ger_oldurme.pdf (accessed: August, 2009).


18. In Brazil, attorneys in murder cases used the “honor-defence” as an excuse to defend husbands who killed their wives; however, honor is not among the mitigating factors listed in the Brazilian Penal Code. It is reported that in Sao Paolo in only one year, 722 men confessed that they had killed their adulterous wives in order to protect their honor (1980-81). See James Brooke, “‘Honor’ Killing of Wives is outlawed in Brazil,” New York Times, March 29, 1991.


27. Sev’er and Yurdakul, “Culture of Honor, Culture of Change.”

28. Afkhami, Nemiroff, and Vaziri, Safe and Secure, 10.

29. Throughout this paper, I use “West” to refer to the mainstream, white Judeo-Christian culture in Europe, the United States, and in Canada. There is no homogenous “West” and “Western” culture, just as there is no homogenous “East” and “Eastern” culture, though. See Rochelle Terman, “To Specify or Single out: Should we use the Term ‘Honor Killing’?” Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 7 (2010): 1-39.

30. The concentration of media ownership in Europe and the United States has a breadth of public discourse. The field is dominated by certain media giants, which also dominate public opinion. However, the media is not totally monolithic, for there are also alternative media sources, which also inform the public.

31. Terman, “To Specify or Single out.”


40. Afkhami, Nemiroff, and Vaziri, Safe and Secure.
43. Ibid., 4.
48. Ibid., 171.
56. Julian Pitt-Rivers brings an example from Andalucía, where the propertied class was relatively free from honor constraints in terms of sexuality, as honor was considered a birthright and its existence was guaranteed for aristocrats. See Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honor and Social Status,” in Honor and Shame: The Values
57. Meetoo and Mirza, “There is Nothing ‘Honorable’ about Honor Killings.”
67. Certainly not all media outlets and NGOs target Muslims, and not all politicians are racist Islamophobes. The aim is not to reify media, politicians, or NGOs in the West, for such generalizations run the risk of Occidentalism.
71. It was reported that in Denmark every year, women aged from 20-35 summon the police due to violence from their husbands or partners. In fact, 29 women
were murdered by their husbands or partners as a result of jealousy. Especially women from eastern Europe, who are married to Danish men with higher life prospects, complain about being continuously beaten up and being restricted to the role of housekeepers and child bearers. See Hasan Cücük, “Danimarka’da Şiddetin Mağduru Doğu Avrupalı Kadınlar” Zaman, August 11, 2011.

72. For instance, shelters for battered wives were initially set up in Britain to deal with British domestic violence rather than migrant women. See Pnina Werbner, “Veiled Interpretations in Pure Space: Honor, Shame and Embodied Struggles among Muslims in Britain and France,” Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 2 (2007): 161-86.


76. Archana Agarwal, “Crimes of Honor.”

77. Ayaan Hirshi Ali is one of those cases. A Dutch woman of Somali descent, she became a public figure in Holland after spelling out her anti-Muslim sentiment: Muslims are intolerant, barbarous, and un-enlightened misogynists. Afterwards, her career skyrocketed to the point that Time Magazine elected her as one of the world’s “100 Most Influential People.” See Saba Mahmood, “Feminism, Democracy, and Empire: Islam and the War of Terror,” in Women’s Studies on the Edge, ed. J. W. Scott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 81-115.

78. Ibid., 83-98.

79. Ibid., 83-98.


84. Meetoo and Mirza, “There is Nothing ‘Honorable’ about Honor Killings,” 194.


89. Sati is a Hindu custom of burning a wife alive with her deceased husband.

90. In pre-modern China, it was believed that women with small feet can marry a wealthy man. For this reason, the process of wrapping girls’ feet upon the commencement of their menstruation was practiced to inhibit the normal growth of their feet.

91. For instance, Spivak explains that abolishing sati is recounted as if it were a case of western white men rescuing local women from their brown, backward, and brutal males who attempted to kill them by burning them alive. See Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 271-72.


94. Islam has also been used by power-seeking groups to justify patriarchy in practice. Examples of mullahs and religious clerics sanctioning tribunal law can be found as far back as the Umayyad dynasty (661-750), which mostly preferred not to disturb local customs to make their administration easier. However, according to the Qur’an and Hadith, Islam opposes both tribalism and honor-related violence.

95. Post-9/11, many NGOs in the United Kingdom have been given money to work on honor-related violence (see: Meetoo and Mirza, 2007). In Sweden, especially after the murder of Fadime Şahindal was covered extensively in the media, many NGOs focused on issues related to honor-related violence. See A Resource Book for Working against Honor-Related Violence 2003; Sherene Razack, Casting Out: Race and the Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).

96. After 9/11, many female writers who identify themselves as insider victims wrote autobiographic novels. According to Saba Mahmood (2008), these books and their writers had been on the agenda for quite a long time with the claim that they told the stories of Middle Eastern women who had constantly been under pressure and were victims of violence. For Mahmood, those books were influential in disseminating Islamophobia among the western public. Among them were Azar Nafisi, Reading Lolita in Tehran (New York: Random House, 2004); Ayaan Hirshi Ali, The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam (New York: Free Press, 2006); Norma Khouri, Forbidden Love: A Harrowing Story of Love and Revenge in Jordan (New York: Bantam Books, 2003); and Carmen Bin Laden, Inside the Kingdom: My Life in Saudi Arabia (New York: Warner Books, 2004).

97. It should also be mentioned that criticizing the abuse of women’s rights by groups of some Muslim extremists is not necessarily Islamophobic, unless this implies a universal hatred for all things Islamic.
104. Razack, Casting Out; Terman, “To Specify or Single out.”
106. Saba Mahmood, “Feminism.”
107. Meetoo and Mirza, “There is Nothing ‘Honorable’ about Honor Killings.”
In this issue

ARTICLES
Honor-related Violence in the Context of Patriarchy, Multicultural Politics, and Islamophobia after 9/11
Nihan Altınbaş

Contemporary Islamic Educational Discourse and the Philosophy of Empowerment
Yousef Rahath and Rosnani Hashim

The Genesis and Development of the Maqāṣid al-Qurʾān
Tazul Islam

Islamophobia, Euro-Islam, Islamism, and Post-Islamism: Changing Patterns of Secularism in Europe
Peter O’Brien

BOOK REVIEWS

FORUM

CONFERENCE, SYMPOSIUM, AND PANEL REPORTS